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1. Introduction 
1.1. Research questions and topic 
Policy coherence for development (PCD) is a principle embraced by the 
European Union (EU) since the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and reinstated in 
various documents including the European Consensus on Development (2005), 
Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the New European Consensus on Development 
(2017). It means that the EU should take its development policy objectives into 
account in other policies that are likely to affect developing countries.1 
However, the commitment to policy coherence for development may not always 
hold in practice. For example, Maurizio Carbone, a prominent scholar of PCD 
and EU development policy, notes: “despite rhetorical commitments made in 
various contexts, results have been modest, as governments in the North have 
found it difficult to go beyond their short-term political and economic interests.” 
(Carbone 2012, 161.) PCD has been framed as a largely technical process, 
although it is inherently a political objective (Carbone 2012). 
One policy area that would be affected by the implementation of policy 
coherence for development is that of migration policy. Migration and 
development have always been connected in multiple and complex ways, and 
indeed migration can be beneficial for social and economic development (see 
e.g. Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 2002). However, in recent 
years, especially as significant increases in the influx of asylum seekers into 
Europe in 2015 led to talk of a ’refugee crisis’ or ’migration crisis’2, the topic of 
migration has become highly securitised – that is, framed from a security 
perspective through discourse and action – and migration policy in Europe has 
become more restrictive (Fakhoury 2016). Since the migration crisis, 
development cooperation seems to be increasingly used to support migration 
                                               
1 E.g. Article 208 of the consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states: 
“Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in 
the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of 
development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing 
countries.” (European Union 2016.) 
2 I recognise that the terms ‘migration crisis’ and “refugee crisis” have various connotations and 
are not wholly unproblematic, but I will use these terms in this thesis to describe the events of 
2015-2016, as these are the terms mostly used in official documents, in the interviews, in the 
literature and in the media. 
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management or “tackle the root causes” behind mass migration: poverty, lack of 
opportunity and violence in the countries of origin and transit (Délkader-Palacios 
2019). 
Instrumentalising development cooperation for migration management sounds 
more like coherence for migration than for development. Rather than focus on 
the ways in which migration policy can contribute to development, which would 
be more in line with the principle of PCD, the EU currently seems to prioritise 
reducing migration, and using development cooperation as part of the 
approach. I became interested in how EU policy conceives of the 
interconnections between migration and development, and what happens when 
PCD is at odds with other political interests focused on security and migration – 
is PCD really taken into account in migration policy, does the EU present 
migration management as coherent with development policy, and what does the 
EU really mean when it talks about coherence? 
This thesis will examine how migration and development are linked in EU 
external policy and how the concept of policy coherence for development (PCD) 
has been used and taken into account in the European Union’s external policies 
focused on the interconnections between migration and development, from the 
beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015 until the end of the Juncker 
administration in late 2019. 
The study seeks to answer the following research questions: 
How are the interconnections between development and migration presented in 
the EU’s external (foreign, development and migration) policy strategies 2015–
2019? To what extent are development and migration policies presented as 
coherent? 
How is the concept of policy coherence for development used in the EU’s 
external (foreign, development and migration) policies 2015–2019? 
What does coherence mean in EU external (foreign, migration and 
development) policy? 
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To answer these questions, the thesis will analyse the concept of policy 
coherence and the interconnections between migration and development in 
three different external policy agendas of the EU, namely the European Agenda 
on Migration (2015, hereafter Agenda on Migration, or Agenda), the Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016, hereafter 
Global Strategy), and the New European Consensus on Development (2017, 
hereafter New Consensus on Development, or Consensus), as well as their 
implementation reports and further communications about migration policy 
issued by the European Commission. The document data is triangulated with 
semi-structured expert interviews, and the data is analysed using qualitative 
content analysis. 
 
1.2. Relevance and context of the topic 
The year 2015 was remarkable in many ways. Following the Commission’s 
proposal, the year was officially designated the “European Year for 
Development”, the first time a “European Year” was dedicated to external action 
and Europe’s role in the world, and an opportunity to “showcase Europe's 
commitment to eradicating poverty worldwide and to inspire more Europeans to 
get engaged and involved in development” (EEAS 2015). It was also the year 
when the Millennium Development Goals came to a close, and a new set of 
objectives, the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development and its seventeen 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), were adopted by the United Nations 
to guide efforts in the global South and North alike in the years to come. Indeed, 
it was in response to this that the New European Consensus on Development 
was written, seeking to implement the 2030 Agenda in the work of the EU. 
However, most people in Europe are more likely to associate 2015 with 
something else, namely the migration crisis. More than one million migrants 
came to Europe by land and sea in 2015, four times more than the previous 
year (BBC 2016). This included various types of migrants; so-called economic 
migrants as well as those fleeing persecution and entitled to a refugee status.3 
                                               
3 The terms migrant, asylum seeker and refugee are sometimes misused in popular discourse. 
‘Refugee’ refers to a person entitled to international protection because they face persecution 
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Although most applied for asylum, the number of those granted asylum was 
much lower (BBC 2016). According to the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (2015), over 75 per cent of those arriving in Europe had fled 
conflict and persecution in Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq, while the rest were mainly 
from Kosovo, Albania, Pakistan, Eritrea, Nigeria, Iran, and Ukraine (BBC 2016). 
The migrants’ journey to Europe was extremely dangerous, and in 2015, more 
than 3 770 migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean, the deadliest 
migration route in the world (BBC 2016; HRW 2015). Furthermore, many 
migrants experienced violence, including torture or sexual violence during the 
journey. Many, if not most, asylum seekers and irregular migrants paid 
smugglers to help them reach Europe, although they were often lied to about 
the conditions in which they would be transported, and some also became 
victims of exploitation and human trafficking. (HRW 2015.) 
In response to the crisis, the EU adopted the Agenda on Migration in May 2015, 
which, as well as providing guidelines for a more comprehensive approach to 
reduce irregular migration, aimed to, as an immediate concern, save lives at 
sea, target criminal smuggling networks, provide a relocation scheme to share 
the burden of the member states that were most affected, coordinate refugee 
resettlement, and cooperate with third countries to tackle migration upstream. 
The influx of migrants entering the EU decreased dramatically after the EU 
signed a controversial cooperation agreement with Turkey in March 2016, and 
in 2017 the number of migrants coming to the EU was below the pre-crisis level 
                                               
due to their origin, nationality, religion, social group or opinion, as defined in the Geneva 
Convention (1951). ‘Asylum seeker’ is a person who seeks protection in a foreign country; after 
the asylum application is processed, some asylum seekers are granted refugee status, while 
others may be given a right to stay on other grounds, and some are considered not to have a 
legal right to stay and may be returned. 
There is no internationally recognised definition for ‘migrant’, but it is generally considered a 
catch-all term for any person (other than refugee or asylum seeker) who has moved to another 
country for whatever reason, for example in pursuit of employment, studies, love or family. 
‘Irregular migrant’ usually refers to a migrant without a legal right to stay - either overstaying 
after a legal right has passed, not being granted a right to stay, or not having applied for any 
right to stay in the first place. An asylum seeker is not an irregular migrant as the right to seek 
asylum is a human right; however, their migration status may become irregular, if they stay in 
the country after their asylum application (and possible appeal) is rejected. The term ‘economic 
migrant’ is sometimes used to denote those (regular or irregular) migrants who have emigrated 
in search of economic opportunity. However, the reasons for emigration are often complex and 
multiple, and in reality those who are considered economic migrants may also be fleeing human 
rights abuses and violence in addition to seeking economic opportunity, or may become victims 
of human rights violations during the journey.  (Amnesty International n.d.; FRC n.d.; HRW 
2015.) 
5 
 
(BBC 2018). However, the fatality of migrant crossings did not decrease in the 
same way, as there were more deaths recorded in 2016, a total of 5 096, 
compared to 2015, despite the radical reduction in migrant crossings (Ibid.).4 On 
the one hand, the EU’s response attracted critique from civil society for 
neglecting the humanitarian disaster and human rights abuses migrants were 
facing. On the other, particularly right wing groups were vocal about the 
supposed security threat and economic burden the migrants posed and called 
for closing all borders. Indeed, in September 2015, several European countries 
reintroduced border controls within the Schengen, prompting calls of a 
“Schengen crisis” (Colombeau 2019). Member states’ division over the 
measures to be taken and especially the relocation and resettlement schemes 
made a coordinated and timely response by the EU challenging to achieve 
(Carrera et al. 2015). 
Thus, the context for the policies I will analyse is one of deep political divides 
and tension, particularly around the topics of migration, security and the EU’s 
role in external policy more generally. This context affected the documents that 
were written at the time, not only migration policy, but also other external policy 
documents. For example, Hyötylä (2018) has analysed how the themes of 
migration and security became much more prominent in the New Consensus on 
Development (2017) compared to the old one, from 2005. This context makes 
EU external policy between 2015–2019 an interesting case for examining the 
securitisation of the policy nexus of migration and development. 
On the other hand, the EU has also been dubbed a “normative power” and is 
considered to act based on certain moral liberal values and promote these 
values, for example human rights and democracy, also in its external action 
(Manners 2002). The European Union is collectively (that is, member states and 
EU combined) the largest donor of development assistance in the world, and it 
is also where the concept of policy coherence for development has gained the 
most prominence (Carbone 2012). Indeed, the principle of PCD has been 
                                               
4 Furthermore, although the absolute number of deaths decreased in the following years, there 
were more deaths in proportion to the number of migrants who reached Europe: in 2015, there 
was one death for every 269 arrivals recorded; in 2016, this went up to one death per 72 
arrivals, and in 2017 to one in 57 arrivals (BBC 2018). 
6 
 
inscribed in the European treaties since Maastricht (1992), and it is often 
referred to in the EU’s development policy context. The EU’s normative basis, 
which has also been linked to PCD (Stocchetti 2013; Häbel 2018), contrasts 
with the migration management measures which have prompted calls of 
“Fortress Europe”, making the migration-development nexus particularly 
interesting to analyse from the perspective of policy coherence. The conflict 
between the EU’s normative principles which it says it abides by, and its actual 
restrictive response to the migration crisis can be interpreted as ‘normative 
incoherence’ (Koff 2017a), and ‘organised hypocrisy’ (Lavenex 2018). 
Indeed, this thesis research contributes to wider literatures on policy coherence 
for development and the securitisation of migration and development. It 
combines various theoretical strands to analyse the EU’s external strategies on 
migration and development from a novel perspective. It explores the policy 
nexus between migration and development and the prominence of policy 
coherence for development in EU external policy documents to determine what 
policy coherence really means in the context of EU policy on the 
interconnections of migration and development. 
This is a particularly topical area of research now that the Juncker Commission 
has just come to the end of its term and this research can provide a reference 
point for the new Von der Leyen Commission; this research helps better 
understand the EU’s external policies following the migration crisis, in particular 
the coherence and dynamics between separate but closely interlinked policy 
fields. Furthermore, as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the treaty between 
the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, is expiring this 
year and negotiations for a new agreement are underway, it is useful to 
examine the EU’s commitment to the principle of PCD, especially as the 
migration clause was controversial in the previous negotiations already (see 
e.g. Van Criekinge 2015). Finally, the topic of migration has remained highly 
prominent since the refugee crisis and seems to remain so for the foreseeable 
future. 
Shedding light on the principles according to which EU external policy is made 
and on the dynamics between interlinked policy sectors, this research also has 
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a societal impact as it helps better understand EU policymaking and thus also 
helps to influence EU politics. This is especially important as the EU, which has 
also been criticised for a lack of transparency and accountability, affects 
hundreds of millions of Europeans directly as well as billions of people in the 
wider world indirectly. Especially as this topic concerns migration policy and 
policy on developing countries, the EU’s impact reaches a very large number of 
people. Therefore it is particularly important to understand EU politics and the 
political choices and dynamics behind EU policies. The thesis will explore how 
mutually contradictory policies may be presented as complementary or 
particular political interests may be pursued under a technical guise of policy 
coherence. Exposing this can enable an open debate about which values 
should guide policymaking, or how to approach sometimes clashing political 
priorities. Although this study is specifically about the coherence of EU external 
policy focusing on migration and development, I hope the research can prove 
useful more generally in the field of policy coherence both among different EU 
policies as well as between policies of different institutions. 
There are countless topics to research, so choosing one is giving importance to 
that particular topic, a way to shed light on a potentially unresearched social 
problem, and a commitment towards gaining knowledge about it. My choice of 
topic reflected my own positive attitude towards the European project and my 
deep conviction that we as EU citizens can and should actively seek to improve 
the EU, as well as my concern for the EU’s response to the migration crisis and 
the extent to which normative principles such as PCD were followed in the 
handling of the crisis. Although I recognise that my own position is by no means 
neutral and this normativity of course affected my topic choice, I do not see this 
as a problem. This kind of normativity is characteristic of the field of critical 
development studies and does not in itself affect the validity of the research. 
Rather, I see it as a motivating factor, which helped me put a lot of time and 
effort into this thesis and conduct a deep and careful analysis. 
The following chapter will lay out the theoretical framework and previous 
research on the topic. Chapter 3 will explain the data and methodology used in 
the study, while chapter 4 will present the findings for each research question. 
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The findings will be discussed in chapter 5, and chapter 6 concludes with 
suggestions for further research and future implications.  
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1. Previous research and theoretical framework 
In this chapter, I will review the relevant literature to place this thesis in the 
context of previous research and theoretical framework. Two main strands of 
literature are explored: first, policy coherence for development in EU external 
policy; and second, literature on the migration-development nexus and the 
securitisation of migration and development. Finally, the chapter will conclude 
with some considerations of normative incoherence and organized hypocrisy as 
explaining the gap between words and action in EU’s external policy. 
 
2.1. The concept of policy coherence for development and its evolution in 
EU external policy 
2.1.1. What is PCD? 
Since the 1990s, increasing attention has been given to the study of policy 
coherence. The OECD defines policy coherence as the “systematic promotion 
of mutually reinforcing policy actions across government departments and 
agencies with the purpose of creating synergies and complementarities so as to 
meet common and agreed objectives” (cited in Sørensen 2016, 63). 
The notion of policy coherence for development (PCD) is similar but narrower, 
as it is focused on development. In PCD, the “common and agreed objectives” 
relate to development policy, hence “for development.” Various definitions have 
been presented for PCD with slightly different implications. 
In his influential report Enhancing Policy Coherence for Development, Guido 
Ashoff (2005, 1) formulates two possible definitions for PCD: “as a first 
definition, the absence of incoherences, which occur when other policies 
deliberately or accidentally impair the effects of development policy or run 
counter to its intentions. A second, more ambitious definition sees policy 
coherence as the interaction of all policies that are relevant in the given context 
with a view to the achievement of overriding development objectives.” Ashoff’s 
first definition is a negative definition, merely the absence of incoherences, 
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while the second one implies prioritising development objectives and actively 
making use of other policies to achieve development objectives. 
Meanwhile, Sørensen (2016, 63) describes the concept as follows: “policies 
across a range of areas – such as for example migration – exploit positive 
synergies and spill overs or, at a minimum, avoid negative consequences.” 
Sørensen’s definition indicates that there may be different levels of coherence – 
from merely minimising negative consequences to actively maximising positive 
synergies – while Ashoff presents the negative and positive definitions as two 
possible but distinct conceptualisations. 
Both of Ashoff’s alternative definitions as well as Sørensen’s definition are 
clearly focused on the interaction between development and non-development 
policies. This is what Maurizio Carbone (2008) calls “horizontal coherence”, the 
coherence between development and non-development policies of a particular 
organisation. This is also the type of coherence that this thesis will analyse, in 
this case more specifically the coherence between migration and development 
policy of the European Commission. 
However, other types of policy coherence have also been identified based on 
the actors involved. In addition to horizontal, there is also vertical coherence, 
i.e. the extent to which EU policies and member state policies are coherent. 
Internal coherence, on the other hand, refers to the consistency within a policy 
field within a country or organisation. Donor-recipient coherence refers to the 
interaction of policies that have been adopted in the donor country and those 
that have been adopted in the developing country. Finally, multilateral 
coherence means the coherence in the interaction between various 
international organizations, such as the EU and the UN. (Carbone 2008; Koff 
2017a.) 
In addition to Carbone’s typology, other categorisations of PCD have also been 
made. For example, Hoebink (2004) makes a distinction between intentional 
and unintentional (in)coherence. Unintentional incoherence can result from 
policymakers’ ignorance of certain policies’ impacts on development policy, for 
example due to limited information or lack of coordination. However, a 
policymaker may even be conscious of negative impacts of a certain policy and 
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still decide to accept them if they believe that they come along with more 
significant positive impacts. (Hoebink 2004.) 
More recently, a new concept of policy coherence for sustainable development 
(PCSD) has emerged, taking a broader scope compared to PCD. The idea is 
that policy coherence should take into account an even more comprehensive 
sustainability perspective, making sure to incorporate all aspects of sustainable 
development (Zeigermann 2018). The concept has gained traction especially 
among civil society and become prominent since the Agenda 2030 negotiations; 
for example Concord (the European confederation of development NGOs) has 
promoted the concept widely. However, some prominent academics, such as 
Maurizio Carbone, have defended sticking to PCD, expressing concern that the 
new concept of PCSD may dilute the PCD agenda and partly “hijack the 
ultimate goal of PCD, that is international development” (Carbone 2016, 19). 
 
2.1.2. PCD in EU external policy 
PCD as a principle was first enshrined in EU policy in the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1992), in the so-called triple-C principles: coordination, complementarity and 
coherence. Coordination referred to a pursuit of consistency and a single voice 
through consultation and coordination, while complementarity referred to the 
fact that development policy is a shared competence and the Commission’s 
development programme should be complementary to those of the member 
states (Carbone 2017, 298). Coherence, which evolved into PCD, meant that 
the EU should take the interest and needs of developing countries into account 
in all its policies (Carbone 2007). 
PCD was not adopted readily by most member states’ aid departments, and 
within the Commission it was trampled by territorial and ideological battles 
between different DGs (Carbone 2017). From the start the most vocal 
proponents of PCD were European NGOs, particularly in the field of 
development. The first decade of the 2000s was the period when PCD grew 
and became more established as a major principle of EU external policy. In 
2005, an ambitious agenda on PCD was initiated, including twelve different 
policy areas and biannual reporting on progress. In 2009, the policy areas were 
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cut down from twelve to five priority focus areas: trade and finance, food 
security, climate change, migration, and security. (Carbone 2017.) 
However, Carbone (2017) notes that despite many member states gradually 
embracing PCD and adopting various mechanisms for it, progress has 
remained fairly limited and the initial enthusiasm has diminished. PCD has 
proven challenging, as it by definition implies coordination and consultation 
between different institutions and across policy fields, each with different 
interests and ideas. Even within the field of development, there are clashes due 
to different views on development policy and the concept of development itself. 
Carbone (2016, 18) concludes that the EU has been “high on mechanisms, but 
low on achievements”, and that “the successful promotion of PCD is not so 
much a matter of bureaucratic arrangements but is primarily a political 
undertaking.” Other scholars, such as Mark Furness and Stephan Gänzle 
agree; although PCD involves technical elements, it is inherently a political 
issue. 
Indeed, Furness and Gänzle (2017) point out that policy objectives of different 
policy sectors may be mutually conflicting. Policy coherence therefore requires 
normative prioritisation of horizontal policy goals to determine the objectives 
with which policies should be coherent. The concept of PCD would suggest 
development policy should be prioritised, as other policies with potential impacts 
for developing countries should take into account development objectives. 
However, its limited success illustrates the lack of political will to actually 
prioritise development over other external policy objectives, such as those of 
trade, security, or migration. 
 
2.1.3. Which coherence? 
The pursuit of policy coherence has also attracted some critique, as it has been 
used by some donor organisations to push for a Western development model 
(Grabel 2007; Thede 2013). Whether or not the concept of PCD itself 
necessarily implies pushing this agenda, a neoliberal agenda and a Western 
conceptualisation of ‘development’ have been promoted under the guise of 
policy coherence. Nancy Thede (2013) identifies two distinct trends in 
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development policy promoted under the ambiguous concept of coherence. First, 
PCD is used to pursue policy coherence for the donor’s security, trade and 
other interests, rather than for development, typically in the form of “whole-of-
government” or “integrated” approaches. Secondly, within the OECD-DAC, the 
group composed solely of donors setting the rules on official development 
assistance, it is used to prescribe a certain development agenda based on 
market liberalisation as the key to development, effectively restricting the 
autonomy of governments in the global South to pursue any other model of 
development or alternative to development. (Thede 2013.) 
Similar to Thede’s and Grabel’s analyses, Jussi Kanner’s (2011) research on 
PCD in the case of the EU’s sugar policy concluded that EU policy was more 
coherent towards trade policy objectives rather than towards development 
objectives. The policy intervention can be considered coherent for development 
primarily based on the expectations of development impacts from free trade, 
rather than from the perspective of the objectives of development cooperation. 
Yet by defining these policies as coherent for development policy, the EU has 
been able to legitimise its mainly free trade supporting initiatives. Thus, Kanner 
finds that PCD can be considered a tool in the fight between free trade and 
protectionism inside the EU’s development policy. This is not because of some 
conspiracy by free trade exponents, but rather resulting from a political norm in 
the trade sector, where free trade and integration to global economy is generally 
considered the best possible path to development for developing countries. 
Kanner concludes that the question of how trade policy should take into account 
the objectives of development cooperation has turned into a question of how 
development cooperation should take into account the impacts of the EU’s other 
policies. (Kanner 2011). 
It should be noted that these findings do not necessarily constitute a critique 
towards the normative idea of policy coherence for development per se; rather 
they expose the use of policy coherence (for development) as a rhetorical tool 
to legitimise a neoliberal harmonisation and aid effectiveness agenda that is 
attached to policy coherence. This is essentially a case of (unconsciously) 
rendering the donors’ political agenda technical, similar to Li’s (2007) and 
Ferguson’s (1994) analyses of development programmes in Indonesia and 
14 
 
Lesotho respectively. In this sense, the pursuit of policy coherence can be 
linked to a (neo)colonial pursuit to govern the global South, determining the 
meaning of development in development cooperation. 
While the conventional approach to PCD taken by donor organisations such as 
the EU and OECD has been quite technical and weak rather than actively 
calling for the political prioritisation of development, and this has been critiqued 
by the critical approach to PCD (Grabel 2007; Thede 2013), Siitonen (2016) 
introduces a third, normative approach. Seeking to build on, and overcome the 
issues in PCD exposed by, the critical approach, the normative approach and 
its concept of normative policy coherence for development (NPCD) stresses the 
normativity inherent in the principle of PCD (Siitonen 2016; Koff 2017b; Häbel 
2018). The normative approach sees PCD as a way to contribute to 
transformative development, which means processes of change that address 
the local needs of communities, integrating human rights and social justice at 
the local and national level, as well as tackling global power imbalances 
(Siitonen 2016; Koff 2017b). Thus it is a departure from the critical approach 
that considers PCD as inherently embedded in the Western tradition of 
development understood as modernisation and economic growth, and sees that 
PCD can be used to contribute to alternative development, if not quite an 
alternative to development. 
Policy coherence for development, especially in this normative approach, has 
also been linked to the concept of normative power Europe (Stocchetti 2013; 
Häbel 2018). Coined by Manners (2002), normative power Europe means that 
the EU as a global actor promotes its core liberal values, such as human rights, 
democracy and liberty, also in its external action and sets them as a norm. This 
normative basis of the EU’s external action is considered to arise from the EU’s 
own nature as a contractually developed community of diverse states and 
actors (Manners 2002; Stocchetti 2013). However, normative power Europe has 
attracted criticism as the EU has often been considered to act in a rather self-
interested manner; for example, Seeberg (2009), analysing the EU’s 
inconsistent democracy-promotion in Lebanon calls the EU “a realist actor in 
normative clothes.” Indeed, so far there has also been little evidence of the EU 
taking the normative approach in its implementation of PCD in practice. Instead, 
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migration and security concerns seem to be increasingly important for the EU’s 
development policy, as the next section will show. 
 
2.2. The security-migration-development nexus and the interconnections 
between migration and development policy in the EU 
2.2.1. What is the migration-development nexus and how are migration 
and development interlinked? 
Migration and development are two distinct yet interlinked phenomena with 
complex and multiple impacts on each other. The notion of “migration–
development nexus” to describe the interconnected phenomena became 
prominent with the 2002 overview article on the topic by Sørensen, Van Hear 
and Engberg-Pedersen. The emergence of the concept was the result of a 
paradigm shift, from seeing migration as a failure or lack of development to 
seeing it as a potential contributor to development (Lavenex and Kunz 2008). 
The main channels through which migration can potentially contribute to social 
and economic development are remittances, return migration and diaspora 
involvement or philanthropy (Koff 2017a; Espinosa 2016; Åkesson 2011). 
Indeed, remittances have become a major source of income for many 
households in the global South and far exceed the amount of official 
development assistance (ODA) donated each year (Lavenex and Kunz 2008). 
On the other hand, migration has been considered to increase brain drain and 
inequality in the country of origin, which has adverse impacts on development. 
Furthermore, the positive impacts of remittances and return migration have 
been questioned. For example, the impact of remittances may be limited due to 
for example unattractive investment environments in countries of origin (De 
Haas 2005), while several factors make it challenging for return migration to 
produce the theorized gains (Åkesson 2011). First of all, migrants working in 
destination countries may not actually have the chance to acquire skills that 
would be useful for development in the country of origin, so returnees’ skills and 
resources may not be adapted to the local situation in the country of origin 
(Ibid.). Furthermore, it typically takes decades to accumulate enough resources 
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for a successful return, so circular migration would actually require a much 
longer time frame than is originally envisioned (Ibid.). Adepoju, Van Noorloos 
and Zoomers (2010) also point out that circular migration may not work as 
intended without economic development and job creation in the country of 
origin, and indeed many labour migrants with temporary visas actually decide to 
overstay their visa even if that means living in irregular circumstances. 
There is a consensus among scholars that in the short-to-medium-term, social 
and economic development typically increases migration (Sørensen 2016). This 
is because very poor people do not have the resources needed to migrate and 
thus development enables migration; and yet the push and pull factors for 
migration remain in place (Sørensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2002). 
 
2.2.2. Migration and development policies interlinked 
In the 2000s, development aid has increasingly been tied to conditions on 
migration control and returnee readmission. This began with the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement (2000), which included a clause on readmission, and 
similar agreements have since been signed with a number of countries 
(Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010; Carbone 2017). Furthermore, 
following the migration crisis in 2015, development policy documents often 
mention ‘tackling the root causes of irregular migration’. 
Critical scholars argue that combining migration and development policies 
seeks to make divisive and sensitive migration policy more digestible and 
harmonious. Geiger and Pécoud (2013, 373) note: “contrary to what notions 
such as ‘cooperation’ or ‘triple-win’ suggest, migration policies are characterised 
by deeply diverging interests between states. In such a context, Western states’ 
efforts to steer the behaviour of sending and transit regions need apparently 
consensual issues to establish a common ground with governments in less-
developed regions. By constructing migration issues in a certain way, this nexus 
thus provides a framework that enables cooperation between states.” Especially 
at the international level, development can be seen as a deal sweetener. 
Skeldon (2008) posits that tying migration to development, a much more 
17 
 
consensual and less sensitive issue than migration, is a strategy to bring the 
topic to discussion at the multilateral level. 
Similarly, politicians at the national level can use a normative discourse to 
legitimise restrictive migration policy. Studying the discourse on the migration-
development nexus in European parliaments, Lauwers, Orbie, and Delputte 
(forthcoming) found that it was not just the development-oriented politicians 
arguing against more restrictive measures who brought up international norms. 
Mainstream politicians from centre-right and centre-left parties arguing for 
restrictive migration measures also used references to international norms and 
development policy institutions, such as the SDGs or the UN agency on 
migration IOM, but their aim was to legitimise the restrictive policy. For instance, 
Lauwers, Orbie, and Delputte (forthcoming) note the German government’s 
justification: “Measures of migration management and migration control serve 
the containment and control of human smuggling and ensuring the framework 
conditions for an orderly, safe, regular and responsible effective migration and 
mobility of people, as is reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals in point 
10.75.” Thus restrictive measures are justified through a language of 
development and international norms, making sustainable development and 
restrictive migration policy mutually compatible. 
Similarly, the EU Commission refers to its approach to migration management 
as “a win-win partnership”, thus using positive rhetoric seeking to present 
migration management and development objectives as mutually coherent, not 
contradictory. For example, as Mark Langan (2018, 163) notes, the Valletta 
Action Plan agreed in 2015 at the height of the refugee crisis, contextualises aid 
for border management “in terms of an overarching concern for human rights.” 
Langan (2018, 164) posits: “EU action to help African states govern migration is 
therefore presented as a benevolent contribution to developing countries – 
preventing people smuggling and ensuring human rights throughout. 
Nevertheless, despite this development discourse, there is much concern that 
instruments such as the Valletta Action Plan represents the securitisation of 
                                               
5 Sustainable Development Goal 10 is “Reduce Inequalities” and includes subgoal 10.7: 
“facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through 
implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.” (United Nations n.d.) 
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development in another form.” In particular, there is concern that tying aid to 
migration control and capacity-building of border control diverts development 
funding away from genuine development or humanitarian programmes. (Langan 
2018.) 
The win-win partnership rhetoric is also questionable as EU and African 
governments tend to have conflicting interests when it comes to migration. De 
Haas (2006) states that many African countries have little genuine interest in 
curbing emigration due to the vital remittances and relief on internal labour 
market pressure it produces. The aid provided in exchange for migration control 
is often too limited to make a significant impact. Mouthaan’s (2019) research on 
Senegal and Ghana illustrates this; remittances are more significant than ODA, 
and reintegrating returnees would bring even more challenges. In addition to the 
economic issues, cooperating with European countries on returns is also 
politically unattractive (Mouthaan 2019). 
This has been the case in previous negotiations, too. For example, Van 
Criekinge (2015, 259–60) notes that “the insertion of a migration clause, Article 
13, was amongst the most contentious issues during the Cotonou negotiations, 
highlighting the weight and importance of the issue for both the EU and the 
ACP. It defines the parameters of the EU-ACP dialogue on migration, and is 
essentially the result of a difficult compromise between the parties’ different 
views and interests. While on the EU side, member states, under domestic 
pressure to reduce irregular migration stemming from Africa, strongly endorsed 
the integration of a readmission clause, instead the ACP was keen on securing 
the rights and protection of their migrants in the EU.” She continues (2015, 262-
3): “While developments in the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy 
have tended to combine repressive measures with incentive instruments in 
order to incite cooperation from sending countries, African governments have 
instead focused largely on enhancing the developmental prospects that 
migration provides.” For all the talk of “partnership”, the reality seems to be 
more skewed, and although African states are by no means ‘passive agents’, 
European interests dominate in multilateral and bilateral agreements signed 
with migrant-sending countries of the South (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and 
Zoomers 2010; Mouthaan 2019). 
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While this may have increased development assistance, Adepoju, Van 
Noorloos, and Zoomers (2010, 62) point out that “the increased link between 
development and migration policy may have harmful long-term effects. For 
example, making cooperation on migration a condition for gaining development 
funds could lead to an undesirable situation where the main countries of 
departure and transit of irregular migrants to Europe secure extra funds while 
other, possibly poorer, countries without direct migrants towards Europe are 
excluded from development aid.” As migration to a certain extent increases with 
the level of social and economic development, the poorest and most vulnerable 
countries – those that would be the obvious recipients of development 
assistance with purely development aims, as the EU’s stated primary objective 
in development policy is poverty eradication – do not pose a migration “threat” 
to the EU and may thus be sidelined when development assistance is tied to 
other concerns. Furthermore, this prioritisation on the basis of security and 
migration concerns can apply also within countries; for example in the case of 
Niger, Delkáder-Palacios (2019) found that development assistance was 
directed towards the mobility hubs within the country, not based on where it 
would be most effective from a development perspective. 
Indeed, this seems to be a valid concern when one looks at where most of EU 
ODA is going: increasingly more has been spent in Turkey, a middle-income 
country that is key for migration control. Since 2009, the EU’s aid spending 
within Europe has more than doubled while its aid for all other regions has 
remained more or less the same (Smith 2017). Smith (2017, 177) notes: 
“Among all aid recipients, Turkey is easily at the top of the list; the EU provided 
over 3 billion USD to that country in 2014, while all other EU aid recipients were 
in the range of several hundred million USD or less, according to OECD 
figures.” This is indicative of the migration focus of aid, as European and 
neighbouring countries are not so poor but rather more important for the EU’s 
security and migration interests. 
Furthermore, this conditionality is not the case only when it comes to official 
development assistance, but other “carrots” the EU can provide as well, such as 
temporary labour mobility schemes or economic/trade partnerships. Moreover, 
many countries use ODA funds to cover humanitarian aid programmes for 
20 
 
repatriated migrants. Thus, ODA is used for a situation arising from the EU’s 
migration policy, as it is EU migration policy that sends the migrants back in the 
first place. (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010.) 
 
2.2.3. Securitisation and the security-migration-development nexus 
Although the phenomena of migration and development are connected in 
multiple and complex ways, in recent years one perspective has become 
increasingly prominent regarding both migration and development policy: 
security. This can be understood as a result of a process of securitisation of 
both development and migration. It has led to a triple nexus of security-
migration-development, which has impacts on migration and development 
policy. 
Securitisation is a concept developed by Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and Jaap de 
Wilde (the so-called Copenhagen School) in the 1990s as a departure from the 
narrow military-related notion of security to a constructivist conceptualisation, 
which considers how ideas of (in)security are socially constructed through 
speech acts (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998; Trombetta 2014; De Roeck, 
Delputte, Orbie 2017). Later on, the Paris School focused on the role of 
mundane practices such as policing and surveillance as drivers of 
securitisation, though the two approaches can also be combined (Trombetta 
2014; Fakhoury 2016). Whether through discourse or practice, the 
phenomenon, for example migration, is framed as a security issue, which also 
legitimises addressing it from a security perspective (Fakhoury 2016; Pinyol-
Jiménez 2012). In the case of migration, this can include the use of law 
enforcement, military, hard borders and other measures that criminalise or 
problematise migrants and portray them as a security threat to be disposed of. 
Securitisation thus prescribes and legitimises a particular response to the 
diagnosed problem by framing the phenomenon as a security issue rather than 
something else, for example a humanitarian issue requiring medical and social 
care. This is not to say migration could not have a security dimension, but 
securitisation reduces and simplifies the complex and multi-faceted 
phenomenon to a security threat and legitimises a particular type of response. It 
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also implies a priority for the security of the West over the security of the rest 
(Sørensen 2012). 
Applied to the case of development policy, securitisation can be understood in 
several ways. It can refer to the legitimation of an exceptional, typically security-
related, response to a perceived threat to Western countries posed by a 
development context, or more broadly a Western attempt to regulate the lives 
and activities of people in the global South (Fisher and Anderson 2015). It can 
also mean the “hijacking”, or instrumentalisation, of aid and development policy 
by security and defence actors in pursuit of Western security interests (Ibid.). In 
the past 20 years, securitisation of development can be seen in the 
transformation of the linkages perceived by Western donors between security 
and development; indeed securitisation of development can be linked to the 
concept of security-development nexus (Keukeleire and Raube 2013.) 
Before the 2000s, security and development were seen to be closely linked as 
insecurity and conflict would tend to hamper development gains while at the 
same time being typically caused by development problems. Since the 9/11 
terrorist attacks in 2001 and the ensuing War on Terror, insecurity in the global 
South began to be seen as a national security threat in the Western donor 
countries. Following this logic, development cooperation in fragile and conflict 
affected states began to be seen as a way to protect donors’ own security. This 
securitisation of development is seen in how security considerations were 
brought into the mainstream of development cooperation, and donors’ own 
security concerns were prioritised over developmental objectives. (McConnon 
2019.) 
The securitisation of EU development policy in the hard sense of using aid for 
militarised or law enforcement operations seems to have been limited by EU 
institutional arrangements (Gibert 2009; Keukeleire and Raube 2013; Gänzle 
and Furness 2016), although one instance can be considered in the case of the 
African Peace Facility (APF) which supports the African Union’s mission in 
Somalia and Sudan and is funded entirely through EU development funds 
(Keukeleire and Raube 2013). However, the EU’s overall relations with Africa 
are increasingly motivated by its own security interests (Gibert 2009, Keukeleire 
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and Raube 2013). Indeed, in the case of the EU, the securitisation of 
development can mostly be seen in the incorporation of development 
cooperation as part of a comprehensive, holistic and coherent approach to 
foreign and security policy. 
Overall, Zwolski (2012) finds that the EU has gradually adopted a holistic 
security discourse, which considers development policy as part of larger, holistic 
security policy and aid as a potential strategic and security instrument. In 
particular, he sees that the incorporation of development into a more 
comprehensive and holistic foreign and security policy is reflected in the reforms 
that followed from the Lisbon Treaty (2009). Keukeleire and Raube (2013, 565) 
similarly note that the “new institutional arrangements installed after Lisbon can 
be seen as strengthening the link between security and development. Prior to 
Lisbon, ‘security’ and ‘development’ were largely viewed as worlds apart, 
separated by the EU’s former pillar structure. -- The Lisbon Treaty formally 
disabled the pillar structure and, in theory, enables the formulation of a coherent 
and integrated foreign policy across former pillars and policy domains, including 
security and development.” Both Zwolski (2012) and Keukeleire and Raube 
(2013) point to two institutional reforms in particular: the establishment of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and the redefined role of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, now also 
Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP). External action is now more 
consistently under the EEAS, with the High Representative/Vice President 
ultimately responsible for its coherent coordination. As part of this reform, 
development policy became a more integrated part of EU foreign policy, and the 
EEAS got a mandate to promote consistency within EU external action policy 
and co-decide on aid programming (Bergmann et al. 2019). Indeed, in their 
analysis of key EU development policy documents, Bergmann et al. (2019) 
found that since Lisbon, there has been a shift in the way coherence is 
approached from a development perspective to a “policy coherence for external 
action” perspective. 
At the same time, migration has also become securitised. Rooted in the 1980s 
already and accelerated after 9/11, the securitisation of migration in Europe is 
not a new phenomenon, as migration had been framed as a security issue for 
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years both through institutionalised migration-restricting policies and populist 
discourses (Huysmans 2000; Karyotis 2007; Fakhoury 2016). However, this 
increased after the Arab Spring in 2011 in the run up to the migration crisis in 
2015–16 (Fakhoury 2016; Pinyol-Jiménez 2012). This included for example elite 
speech acts calling the inflow of displaced people from Tunisia an “invasion” of 
Europe, as well as securitising practices such as the construction of fences 
along borders and reintroducing border controls within Schengen (Fakhoury 
2016). 
In addition to the discourse and restrictive measures, Fakhoury (2016, 74) 
points out that the security focus is also present in the EU’s refugee aid 
programmes: “By donating aid and declaring its intent to “tackle migration 
upstream” through partnerships with third countries, the EU adopts elements 
derived from the human security model while catering for its security interests – 
that is, controlling migration from a distance.” Thus, although the aid has a 
human security objective, it is at the same time used to control migration for the 
EU’s own security interests. The use of aid to control migration because 
migration is securitised shows how the securitisation of both migration and 
development produces a triple security-migration-development nexus. 
The triple nexus is also analysed by Augusto Delkáder-Palacios (2019) in the 
case of migration-related conditionalities in EU development policy. Delkáder-
Palacios analyses the Agenda on Migration and the Partnership Framework and 
conducts a case study of Niger to understand the context of securitisation under 
which migration-related conditionalities on development assistance are 
established and what their impacts on development policy are. Delkáder-
Palacios finds that the EU uses conditionalities on aid to reward or penalise 
countries based on their cooperation on migration management in a context 
where migration is securitised. He finds that the subordination of development 
objectives and instruments to migration and security objectives has negative 
impacts on the effectiveness, efficiency and autonomy of development policy. 
(Delkáder-Palacios 2019). 
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2.3. Normative Incoherence and Organised Hypocrisy? 
As we have seen, the EU’s development policy is considered to have a 
normative, liberal value basis and the EU is officially committed to policy 
coherence for development. However, the implementation of normative policy 
coherence for development has been lacking, as the EU’s development policy is 
increasingly driven by other concerns, such as migration and security, and the 
EU is seeking coherence in its external action. This can create an incoherence 
between the EU’s commitments to PCD and its actual policy practice. This is 
what Koff (2017a, 11) considers “normative incoherence”, meaning the 
“incoherence between policy strategies in development and non-development 
policy arenas and core values of liberal democratic societies.” 
One example of normative incoherence is analysed in Sandra Häbel’s (2018) 
PhD thesis, where she examined the EU’s normative policy coherence for 
development in the case of Vietnam. She found that the normative issues were 
a political concern at the multilateral level, but they did not translate into practice 
at the bilateral level in development or trade practices, leading to normative 
incoherence. 
However, the EU may not acknowledge the existence of such incoherence. The 
EU may have a number of policy objectives which it presents as 
complementary, while in reality they may be contradictory, or not interlinked 
enough for certain action to have a positive impact for both objectives. In such 
cases, the less prioritised objectives may in the end be pure rhetoric to perform 
the role of a normative actor while the action taken is driven by the more 
prioritised policy objectives. 
One example related to migration and development was the EU’s Blue Card 
directive – a labour mobility scheme seeking to promote development gains 
through circular migration. In her thesis, Kukka Korhonen (2012) found that the 
initiative had only limited impact on development. For it to benefit the poorest 
countries, such as Malawi, the directive should have taken into account the 
local conditions in countries of origin, which are known to largely determine the 
development impacts of migration. However, this was not possible, as the main 
objective of the directive was to address the EU’s internal interests. The 
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development impact of the policy rested on a false assumption that circular 
migration would alone be sufficient to guarantee development benefits from 
migration. Therefore the principle of PCD was not achieved, and any use of the 
concept of PCD in the policy was rather simplifying rhetoric. (Korhonen 2012.) 
Another case of incoherence between objectives can be found in the case of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which is declared to promote both 
effective and democratic governance. Börzel and van Hüllen (2014, 1033) note 
that “while the ENP conceives of the two objectives as complementary, the 
democratization of (semi-)authoritarian countries entails the risk of their 
destabilization at least in the short run. As a result, promoting effective and 
democratic governance become conflicting objectives.” Börzel and van Hüllen 
(2014, 1044) find that “the lower the level of political liberalization and the higher 
the instability of a country, the more ineffective the EU is in asserting a 
democratic reform agenda in the ENP Action Plans, clearly favouring stability 
over change.” These clashes between the EU’s own interests undermine the 
effectiveness of the ENP. Börzel and van Hüllen (2014, 1045) conclude: “When 
dealing with non-democratic countries, the democratization-stabilization 
dilemma forces the EU to choose among its conflicting objectives and it seems 
unlikely that it will suddenly prioritize democratization over stabilization. 
However, the least the EU could do is to acknowledge that all good things do 
not necessarily go together and that its declared objectives may come into 
conflict.” 
Organisational sociology and Brunsson’s (1989) concept of “organized 
hypocrisy” can help explain this failure to acknowledge the incoherence 
between declared objectives and actual policy action. Lavenex (2018) draws on 
this concept in her analysis of the EU’s response to the refugee crisis and the 
gap between the EU’s words and action. 
Organisational sociology considers organisations as a reflection of their 
environments: the technical or strategic environment, i.e. the actors’ interests 
and interaction, material and institutional constraints; and the normative or 
moral environment, i.e. the ideational pressures of the social norms and values 
perceived as appropriate in the wider societal context. Both environments 
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produce expectations for the organisation, which can be mutually contradictory. 
“Organized hypocrisy” refers to a situation where the strategic environment and 
the normative environment lead to mutually contradictory expectations, and the 
organisation deals with this contradiction by trying to distance and decouple the 
normative core and discourse from strategic action. (Lavenex 2018.) 
In the case of the EU’s refugee crisis the result is “a cleavage between what the 
EU says it is doing - its espoused goals and ideals (the protective acquis) - and 
what it actually does (restrictive practices preventing access to protection).” 
(Lavenex 2018, 1200). Lavenex (2018, 1200) notes that “‘hypocrisy’ does not 
flow from intentional action but is the result of complex organizations’ struggle to 
uphold expected norms and values on the one hand while responding to the 
priorities and contingencies expressed by their technical environment. -- The 
attempt to satisfy incompatible demands without giving in on either of them 
results in incoherent action and a sense of hypocrisy.” 
Lavenex (2018, 1208) notes that in some ways, organized hypocrisy is a 
necessity for the EU, as the normative standards are enshrined in law, but the 
technical constraints posed by member states unwilling to budge on the 
question of refugees create a very real limit to action: “As Brunsson (1989, p. 
33) has argued, decoupling normative ambition from political action can be the 
only way organizations can manage inherently conflictual demands in their 
environments, which cannot be reconciled. In other words, decoupling allows 
the EU to uphold its normative standards of appropriateness at the level of ‘talk’ 
and ‘decision’ while at the same time in ‘action’ respecting the limits imposed by 
recalcitrant Member States (Brunsson, 1989).” 
However, though it may be a way to deal with the issue of conflicting demands 
in the short term, this organized hypocrisy may have adverse consequences at 
least in the long term as it can undermine the organisation’s credibility. Lavenex 
(2018, 1208) explains that organized hypocrisy “creates a capabilities-
expectations gap which, in times of political pressure, slowly undermines the 
organization’s credibility.” Lavenex (2018, 1209) points out an example of how 
the response to the refugee crisis has undermined the EU’s actorness in 
international negotiations: “in the third (and latest) round of negotiations [for the 
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UN Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration], it was no longer 
the Commission who spoke ‘on behalf of the European Union ’, but Austria who 
spoke ‘on behalf of 27 European States’, while Hungary spoke on its own.”  
Lavenex (2018, 1209) concludes that “the incapacity to bridge normative 
expectations and political action may, in the long run, challenge the very idea of 
a common European policy.” 
 
2.4. Conclusions of the literature review 
This literature review has provided a context and a theoretical framework to 
help explain and interpret the findings of this research. The literature has shown 
that migration and development are connected in multiple and complex ways, 
but it seems that in recent years, as both phenomena have been securitised, 
the EU’s development cooperation is increasingly being used for migration 
management. This is conflicting with the inherently normative principle of policy 
coherence for development which the EU has committed to. However, this is 
not surprising as the literature indicates the EU has always been reluctant to 
prioritise development over other policy objectives, and the concept of policy 
coherence has also been used to push a neoliberal agenda. Still, the conflict 
between normative principles and the instrumentalisation of aid can lead to 
normative incoherence and organized hypocrisy, which can undermine the EU’s 
credibility as a global actor and supposedly normative power. The findings of 
this thesis can further illuminate how the interconnections between migration 
and development are considered in EU external policy, to what extent the EU is 
committed to PCD and what is actually meant by coherence in EU external 
policy, and to what extent the EU’s affirmations of commitment to PCD are 
indicative of development-oriented policy action or normative incoherence and 
organized hypocrisy.  
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2. Data and Methods 
3.1. Research design 
Research methods should be selected based on the research questions, 
choosing the most suitable type of data and analytical method for the questions, 
following the particular epistemological approach the research questions are set 
in. 
This thesis takes a constructivist approach, whereby meaning is not a given but 
rather socially constructed. This approach is clear in how the thesis is 
concerned with how words and concepts are used to construct particular ideas 
– how policy coherence (for development) and the interconnections between 
migration and development are presented in the EU’s external policy. On the 
other hand, the questions also require analysis of the substance of policy 
documents and expert views, not just the discourse or frames used, and 
therefore I decided to use content analysis instead of discourse analysis as my 
analytical method. 
The thesis uses two sources of data: policy documents and expert interviews. 
Policy documents are the main source of data, but data from expert interviews 
is used to triangulate the results of the document data in order to increase the 
reliability and validity of the findings. 
Triangulation in research refers to the use of two or more approaches to study a 
question, making the findings more comprehensive and reliable. Triangulation 
can result in converging, complementary, or diverging results from the 
approaches used. Heale and Forbes (2013, 98) note: “Converging results aim 
to increase the validity through verification; complementary results highlight 
different aspects of the phenomenon or illustrate different phenomenon and 
divergent findings can lead to new and better explanations for the phenomenon 
under investigation.” Despite some concern over the comparability of different 
types of data, triangulation is “generally considered to promote a more 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study and to enhance 
the rigour of a research study”, according to Heale and Forbes (2013, 98). 
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Triangulation can be done by using more than one way to gather data, or more 
than one analytical method. In this thesis, I am using two different sources of 
data, while the analytical methods for them are similar, with only slight 
differences. A critical content analysis of the document data allows me to study 
how concepts are presented and what they mean in EU external policy 
documents. This is complemented with a content analysis of interview data, 
which provides more context for the policy documents and the practice of 
coordination and policy coherence in the EU. 
Content analysis can be considered a “flexible” research method, as the 
practical approaches vary quite a lot, with the uniting feature being the 
interpretation of textual data through a process of coding and identifying themes 
or patterns. Content analysis allows the researcher to adapt the specific 
analytical technique and approach to their particular research questions, 
theoretical framework and data. Essentially qualitative content analysis entails 
closely reading, interpreting and re-contextualising pieces of text. Beach et al. 
(2009, 130) note that ”[w]hat makes a study “critical” is not the methodology but 
the framework used to think within, through, and beyond the text.” (Beach et al. 
2009.) 
Indeed, this flexibility to adapt content analysis was also useful in my thesis due 
to the differences in the nature of the two types of data. Thus, there are slight 
differences in the methods used to analyse the different data due to the type of 
data involved; the enormous amount of document data requires first a 
systematic screening to filter hundreds of pages of documents into passages of 
text relevant for the research questions, whereas the interview data in the form 
of interview notes is more manageable from the outset. After the initial phase of 
filtering out irrelevant parts, the analytical process of close reading of passages, 
summarising their meaning and grouping passages together based on themes 
or keywords and analysing those, was basically the same for both sets of data. 
The focus in both document data analysis and interview data analysis was on 
what was said, rather than how it was said. However, the approach taken in the 
document analysis was more critical and included scrutinising the text passages 
for word choices, absences of particular terms, and nuances that affect the 
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conveyed meaning beyond the substance. 
 
3.2. Document data gathering and analysis 
My primary data consists of the policy strategies and documents issued by the 
European Union on EU foreign, migration and development policy from 2015 
until the end of the Juncker administration in 2019. Specifically, I am analysing 
the Agenda on Migration (2015), the Global Strategy (2016), and the New 
European Consensus on Development (2017), as well as their implementation 
reports and further communications about the implementation of the Agenda on 
Migration issued by the European Commission. All of these documents are 
readily available online. 
The reason for choosing these particular documents was that they are 
documents of the Commission and the EEAS, the institutions which are 
primarily concerned with the EU’s own agenda, rather than the Council, which 
represents the member states, or the Parliament, which represents the people. 
The Commission is also the institution that has had the most significant role in 
promoting PCD in the EU (Carbone 2012). Thus the documents of the 
Commission and EEAS are the ones most suited when analysing EU policy. 
However, it should be noted that the New European Consensus on 
Development was a joint consensus adopted by all three institutions – the 
Commission, Council, and Parliament. 
For each of the three strategies, the entire document was carefully read and 
analysed, taking notes and reading key passages several times in order to 
ensure familiarity with these strategies and their contents on policy coherence 
and links between development and migration. I also copied all relevant 
paragraphs into a spreadsheet. 
After becoming familiar with the overall strategies, I went through the 
implementation reports and further communications based on them, in total 131 
documents. Systematically, for each of these documents, I searched (using 
basic software, the find function ctrl+f) for any mention of “policy coherence for 
development”, “PCD”, “policy coherence for sustainable development”, “PCSD”, 
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“development”, “policy coherence”, “coheren*” (i.e. capturing “coherence” and 
“coherent”), and “migration-development nexus”. I discarded those documents 
with no mention of these words, or using the word in another context (for 
example, development not in the sense of development assistance or 
cooperation but e.g. as the evolution or establishment of something). For each 
document with any of these words used, I read and analysed each mention 
carefully, and copied all potentially relevant paragraphs into the spreadsheet, 
thus producing a dataset. A list of all documents with relevant paragraphs can 
be found in the appendix, in total 23 documents. 
After gathering the data in this way, I had produced a dataset of all the 
potentially relevant paragraphs from the documents, grouped based on the 
search words mentioned in the paragraph, as well as “other” for other potentially 
relevant paragraphs from the overarching strategies. I then created a new 
spreadsheet with a tab for each research question and went through all the 
paragraphs copying relevant paragraphs into the new spreadsheet under the 
research questions. At this point, I also left out some of the text that I had 
included in the initial dataset from the new spreadsheet, as now under closer 
reading I deemed some passages irrelevant for the research questions. 
However, I kept those passages in the initial dataset so that I could find them 
again later if needed. 
Then, I analysed and summarised the meaning of each paragraph in a few 
words and grouped the passages of text into categories based on themes or 
keywords that emerged, for example “root causes”, “positive contribution of 
migration”, “leverage”. Carefully analysing the meanings of the grouped 
passages, I formulated the messages conveyed by the groups of text into 
sentences. I reviewed the document analysis after analysing the interview data, 
checking again that I had not left out anything that might later turn out to be 
more relevant and that the findings I had were still relevant. 
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3.3. Interview data gathering and analysis 
In addition to the document data, I also conducted semi-structured interviews 
with key informants. The interview data was used to triangulate the results of 
the document analysis. 
I sought interviewees from all the relevant EU institutions, which I determined to 
be EEAS, DG DEVCO and DG HOME. In addition, I sought some external 
experts – people who have worked closely on the topic of PCD and EU 
development policy for years in the academic and public sphere but are not EU 
officials. After coming up with a list of people to contact, I sent them emails 
requesting an interview for thesis research. For the EU officials, I sent emails to 
potentially suitable interviewees or division heads asking if they or someone 
from their division would be available for an interview, and many of them kindly 
forwarded the request to someone in their division, who either agreed to an 
interview or again redirected me to someone else. I sent gentle reminders and 
new requests until I had at least one interviewee from each relevant institution. 
In the beginning of each interview, I asked the interviewee to briefly describe 
their work and their familiarity with the topic of research, just to make sure they 
were all suitable interviewees, and that I would better know which questions 
were more or less relevant for each interviewee. 
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Codename Affiliation6 Date and place of 
interview 
Interviewee 1/ H1 EEAS 28th Feb 2020 (phone) 
Interviewee 2/ H2 Development Policy Committee 
of a member state 
9th Mar 2020, Helsinki 
Interviewee 3/ H3 EEAS 23rd Mar 2020 (phone) 
Interviewee 4/ H4 Civil society 24th Mar 2020 (phone) 
Interviewee 5/ H5 DG DEVCO 15th Apr 2020 (phone) 
Interviewee 6/ H6 DG DEVCO 17th Apr 2020 (phone) 
Interviewee 7/ H7 DG HOME 22nd Apr 2020 (phone) 
Table 1. Anonymised list of interviewees. 
 
The acquired interviewees represent the relevant policy-making instances in the 
EU as well as external experts in EU development policy and policy coherence 
for development. Thus there is both internal perspective of the EU and an 
external aspect of experts following EU policy from the outside. Although the 
number of interviews is relatively low, this diversity of perspectives adds value 
to the interview data. As the research is mainly focused on the document 
analysis and the interview data is only used to triangulate the results of the 
document analysis, this data was sufficient. It also became saturated. 
The aim of semi-structured interviews is to gather information, and thus the 
focus is on the interviewee and the interaction is not a naturally flowing 
conversation (Hirsjärvi and Hurme 2011). The focus being on the interviewee’s 
perspective and interpretations is useful in trying to get perspectives from 
different institutions. In semi-structured interviews, some questions are fixed, 
but not all. Thus, semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate type of 
data gathering for expert views in my research. 
                                               
6 I decided not to disclose more detailed information of the interviewees, such as their position 
or unit, in order to ensure full confidentiality. However, I would like to note that the interviewees 
at EEAS and at DG DEVCO were from different units. In addition, it should be noted that 
although I am listing here only their current work place to ensure full confidentiality, in the case 
of some interviewees I am also aware of some other background information which can add to 
their relevance as interviewees, such as a relevant academic background or having previously 
worked at a different but relevant EU institution. 
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A basic list of pre-determined questions which were the same for every 
interviewee ensured that all the relevant areas were covered. My questions 
were more specific than is perhaps typical in semi-structured interviews, 
because I had already conducted document analysis and the findings of that 
influenced the questions – I formulated the questions in order to get supporting 
or contradicting views and background information on the findings from the 
document analysis. However, although the basic questions were the same for 
everyone, I asked different additional or clarifying follow-up questions based on 
the interviewee’s answers, in order to elicit more information. This was also 
useful due to the diversity of interviewee positions, as interviewees in different 
positions had more knowledge on different aspects, and thus it varied slightly 
which questions were most relevant for each interviewee. However, the 
answers were very complementary in the end, despite the diversity of positions. 
Thus the data was actually saturated with these interviewees. 
The interviewees gave their consent to participate in this study through replying 
positively via email to my request for an interview for this thesis, agreeing to 
participate in an interview. Prior to the interview, I gave each interviewee 
information on the topic of research and, where asked, the main questions for 
consideration. I noted that the interviews were confidential and any quotes 
would be used without revealing the interviewee’s identity.7 I also notified each 
interviewee of their right to stop the interview at any point without 
consequences. I also gave the interviewees my contact details and informed 
them that they could contact me at any time should they have questions 
regarding the research later on. 
As the interviews were conducted to triangulate the results of the document 
analysis and the method of analysis was content analysis, I did not consider it 
necessary to produce full litterations of the interviews. The document data had 
already been analysed for the most part, so what I was looking for in the 
interviews was more general and focused on content, so it was not necessary to 
                                               
7 Table 1 above presents the list of anonymised interviewees, but in addition to this 
anonymisation, when presenting the results, I decided to avoid singling out which interviewee 
said what and rather say e.g. “one interviewee” or “some interviewees” or “interviewees at DG 
DEVCO”, only revealing which interviewee said something when it is relevant. 
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record every pause and utterance from the interviews, but rather record the 
main things the interviewees said. Six out of seven interviews were conducted 
over the phone and were not recorded, but I took comprehensive notes during 
the interviews. One interview was conducted in person and was recorded just in 
case, but I also took extensive notes and deleted the recording after making 
sure my notes covered everything. The interviews lasted between 50 minutes to 
90 minutes each. 
I analysed the interview data using content analysis as my method. In practice, I 
had the same spreadsheet I had used for the document analysis, with different 
tabs for each research question. I went through all the interview notes and 
copied sentences or paragraphs onto the spreadsheet, pasting them under 
what I deemed to be the relevant research question, or under several research 
questions, if the sentence or paragraph seemed relevant for more than one 
research question. Of course, not all text was relevant for the research 
questions; thus I discarded pieces of text that were not relevant for any of the 
research questions but kept them in the notes of the interview so I could find 
them again later if needed. 
I then analysed and summarised the meaning of each piece of text (sentence or 
paragraph) and grouped the pieces of text into categories based on themes or 
keywords, similarly to the document analysis. I went through each theme, re-
reading paragraphs closely, noting similarities and differences in the pieces of 
text as well as links to other themes or findings from the documents. I 
formulated the messages conveyed by the groups of text into short sentences 
and then edited and put those together to form the findings for each question. 
Of course, there were many more things that emerged from the data than these 
findings, but I focused on the things that were relevant for my particular 
research questions. 
 
3.4. Ethical considerations 
All research has to contend with ethical considerations that are particular to the 
research at hand. In the case of this thesis, the main ethical consideration in the 
data gathering phase involved the interviews: informed consent, which was 
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secured as discussed above. As the documents analysed were public 
documents, publically available on the Commission’s website, there were no 
ethical issues in acquiring this data. 
The next ethical question was concerned with the proper handling of the data. 
Interview data was handled with respect for anonymity and confidentiality of 
interviewees as promised when they consented to the interviews, and data was 
used solely for the purpose of scientific research and not for any other purpose. 
The research process is always vulnerable to the biases and failings of the 
researcher, especially as content analysis as a method involves interpreting 
data in a particular context, perhaps re-contextualising what was said. Although 
another researcher might have focused on other things in the same data, 
indeed formulating a wholly different set of research questions, this does not 
invalidate my findings, as they were the result of a rigorous and respectful 
analysis of the data, carefully reflected upon and contextualised in a theoretical 
framework informed by previous research. 
The last ethical consideration of the writing process was that of standard 
scientific referencing. My research was produced in a certain context with 
previous research and theoretical literature helping me form my topic and 
research design and put my findings in context. My work and its failings are my 
own but I have cited previous work where I have used them to show credit 
where credit is due. 
Finally, ethics do not end once the thesis is finished. The confidentiality and 
proper handling of the data continues, and the next step after submitting the 
thesis is to spread the knowledge gained. I will send the finished thesis to all my 
interviewees as well as anyone else interested. I will put the knowledge and 
skills I have gained to use, both as an employee as well as in my capacity as an 
active (EU) citizen. I believe it is important to make knowledge accessible and 
use the knowledge we have, thus popularising science and advocating for 
change in order to make the world a better place. 
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4. Findings 
 
4.1. Findings on the interconnections between migration and development 
and perception of coherence between development and migration policy 
 
This chapter will present the findings of the data analysis on each of the 
research questions. This first section looks at the findings on the first two, 
interlinked, research questions: How are the interconnections between 
development and migration presented in the EU’s external (foreign, 
development and migration) policy documents; and, to what extent are 
development and migration policies presented as coherent? 
The policy documents link development and migration mainly through the so-
called root causes. Many of the root causes of irregular migration that are 
identified in the documents are traditional development problems, such as 
poverty and conflict. Similarly, several of the interviewed experts noted that the 
root causes of migration tend to be very similar to the root causes of poverty or 
other complex development problems. The documents also present 
development cooperation as a way to tackle the root causes of migration. For 
example, the Agenda on Migration states: 
“Many of the root causes of migration lie deep in global issues which the 
EU has been trying to address for many years. -- Civil war, persecution, 
poverty, and climate change all feed directly and immediately into 
migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary 
importance for the migration debate. -- With a budget allocation of EUR 
96.8 billion for the 2014-2020 period, EU external cooperation 
assistance, and in particular development cooperation, plays an 
important role in tackling global issues like poverty, insecurity, inequality 
and unemployment which are among the main root causes of irregular 
and forced migration. This includes support in regions of Africa, Asia and 
Eastern Europe where most of the migrants reaching Europe originate 
from. As well as addressing long-term root causes, the EU helps to 
mitigate the impact of crisis at a local level.” (European Commission 
2015a, 7-8.) 
This quote illustrates how development problems are considered driving factors 
of migration and therefore addressing them both preventively and reactively 
through development cooperation is considered important also from the point of 
view of migration management. In this sense, migration and development 
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policies are presented as coherent, as the issues development policy is 
designed to address are also causing migration. However, it is clear the focus is 
on reducing irregular migration, as this tackling the root causes is part of the 
Agenda’s section on “reducing the incentives for irregular migration”. 
However, although the phrase “tackling the root causes of irregular migration” 
comes up frequently in the policy documents, among the people working on 
these topics in the EU, there is an understanding of the complexity of these 
phenomena and that development does not decrease migration. This came up 
in interviews with the EEAS, DG HOME and DG DEVCO. It is a politically 
attractive idea, but actually development cooperation used to tackle the root 
causes of migration is not very effective. One interviewee says: “No one has the 
patience with migration; everybody expects to see results in the first six months, 
and development cooperation doesn’t work like that, it’s long term. -- 
Development is not going to stop migration, it’s not the right tool, clearly.” 
The policymakers know this. Therefore the point of “tackling root causes” is only 
one part of the whole approach. Another interviewee says: “We know from 
studies that actually providing support for the root causes, paradoxically, 
increases the drive for people to migrate. So clearly if it was just for our own 
interests, we would not have done that.” The interviewee explains how there are 
various different interests, and everything is put together in a package that has 
something for everyone. This is similar to another interviewee’s note that 
development policy is sometimes used as part of a deal. The interviewee 
explains that development cooperation can be used to make an agreement 
“win-win”; “it can be a kind of deal softener or deal sweetener.” 
Using development cooperation to tackle the root causes of irregular migration 
does not necessarily mean development cooperation is instrumentalised for 
migration management. As noted above, the root causes of migration that are 
mentioned in the documents include poverty, inequality, conflict, climate change 
and other complex phenomena which (or the impacts of which) development 
cooperation is designed to address in the first place. The root causes can be so 
broad that using development cooperation for that could mean much the same 
kinds of projects as before, simply packaged as tackling migration. 
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However, there were also a number of explicit references to using development 
cooperation, among other policy instruments, as “leverage” for migration 
management. For example, in Communication on the state of play (02/2016), 
Commission recommendations for the Council include: 
“To help manage the refugee crisis effectively, leaders at the February 
European Council should commit to: -- A major stepping-up of all efforts 
to ensure effective returns and readmission and to address the root 
causes of migration by maximising all forms of leverage, including trade 
preferences and development, to secure third countries' commitment to 
concrete outcomes.” (European Commission 2016a, 3-4.) 
Later that year, the Communication on establishing a new Partnership 
Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration 
(06/2016) states: 
“the European Council is invited to endorse: The establishment of a new 
Partnership Framework to mobilise and focus EU action and resources to 
better manage migration with third countries. The full range of EU and 
Member States' policies and instruments should be used to achieve this 
objective. A mix of positive and negative incentives will be integrated 
notably into the EU's development and trade policies to reward those 
countries willing to cooperate effectively with the EU on migration 
management and ensure there are consequences for those who do not 
cooperate.” (European Commission 2016b, 17.) 
Migration management and migration policy objectives such as returning 
irregular migrants to countries of origin are considered a priority here, for which 
development cooperation can be used as leverage. Leverage here means using 
development assistance to give a positive incentive rewarding those countries 
that are cooperating with the EU on this question and negative incentives in 
case the country is not cooperating. Given that development assistance thus 
very concretely depends on the cooperation (or lack thereof) of partner 
countries on migration questions, it is clearly not given based on developmental 
concerns but rather based on migration concerns. In this case, development 
can be considered to be instrumentalised for migration management. 
The above examples are from migration policy. However, the same approach is 
also found in development policy. The New European Consensus on 
Development (2017, 17–19) states: 
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“The EU and its member states will take a more coordinated, holistic and 
structured approach to migration, maximising the synergies and applying 
the necessary leverage by using all relevant EU policies, instruments and 
tools, including development and trade. Through these strengthened 
efforts, the EU and its Member States will actively support the further 
implementation of the joint 2015 Valletta Action Plan and the elaboration 
of the UN Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees, as called for by 
the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. -- Through 
development policy, the EU and its Member States will address the root 
causes of irregular migration and will, inter alia, contribute to the 
sustainable integration of migrants in host countries and host 
communities and help ensure the successful socioeconomic integration 
of returning migrants in their countries of origin or transit.” 
Thus also the development policy documents talk of using development as 
leverage for migration management and to address the root causes of irregular 
migration. 
Indeed, the interviews highlighted that the way in which development and 
migration are linked has shifted since 2015, towards focusing more on how 
development cooperation can be used to support migration management. 
Whereas before 2015, migration and development were linked in a different way 
(for example supporting developing countries that are struggling with migration), 
since the crisis the only link that is politically feasible is how development 
cooperation can be used for migration management, and considering migration 
only in the sense of immigration into the EU. One interviewee from DG DEVCO 
says: 
“Before 2015 we didn’t even have a lot of funding for migration at 
DEVCO. Then in 2015, all of a sudden, big crisis, trust funds... enormous 
amounts of money came into play. Before that we worked with other 
countries on migration that didn’t even have to do with the EU, like 
Thailand or South Africa. Then, in 2015, migration into the EU is the 
priority. In DEVCO, one of the things we are doing is we are supporting 
countries receiving migrants from Venezuela. Since 2015, people are 
asking why are we working with these, if they have nothing to do with the 
EU. Member states are asking why are we spending any money on any 
other countries. That [stopping spending on any other countries] is luckily 
not happening but there are demands. -- That is an extreme and it is 
illegal and we are not doing that, but there are certainly demands and 
proposals. Before 2015, it used to be the ‘usual suspects’, but since 2015 
it’s all countries, even the ‘good countries’, it’s Germany, France, 
Sweden. It has become okay to demand that.” 
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Similarly, from another perspective, DG HOME was not so interested in the 
migration-development nexus before the crisis. An interviewee from DG HOME 
says: 
“They [migration and development] may have been linked all the time but 
we didn’t realise that it would be necessary to make use of them. That 
came with the crisis. Before, things were under control, it [migration-
development nexus] didn’t really impact on the European Union, so us as 
[DG] HOME, we wouldn’t be that concerned with that. So that’s why I 
think it was really the migration crisis that really triggered this migration-
development nexus and made us realise how important it is.” 
DG DEVCO, on the other hand, has been working on migration and 
development since the early 2000s, so this was not a new topic for them. 
However, the focus has changed over the years, as the crisis forced DG 
DEVCO to also focus on migration into the EU. 
On the other hand, there is now better coordination within the Commission, 
which has also improved coherence, interviewees from both DG DEVCO and 
DG HOME attest. An interviewee from DG DEVCO says: 
“The only good thing about the crisis in 2015 was that now we have 
weekly coordination meetings, and this is something that is taken very 
seriously, these are high level meetings. The crisis triggered this. The 
meetings are chaired by Sec-Gen, so neutral. All the services (so 
DEVCO, ECHO, HOME, NEAR, EEAS…) have to be there. It has led to 
a better understanding, for for example ECHO and HOME to understand 
our mandate and why we cannot do certain things. They of course also 
have a perfectly legitimate mandate. -- [It has increased] understanding 
that DEVCO cannot for example pay for return flights with development 
funding. In the past, HOME would have a hardline negotiation with one of 
our partner countries regarding migration, which would hamper 
development and other things. Now they have a much better 
understanding on the overall cooperation and relations. These things are 
discussed in these meetings, whether migration is a priority or trade 
relations. And returns are always important.” 
An interviewee from DG HOME has similar ideas, saying coordination has 
improved because everyone had to work together due to the crisis. The 
interviewee says: 
“Before, it was that we have different objectives, and development is for 
development, and it cannot be linked with everything else or leveraged 
because it’s development. That I think impaired our leverage when we 
were discussing our parts with third countries. We would have our own 
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challenges, let’s say returns, and we would say [to third countries] you 
should do this and this. And they would just note it. But we had no 
leverage, we couldn’t link it to development projects or something.” 
This shows that coordination and coherence has improved. However, 
development never seems to be a priority - rather, migration has become a 
priority, and while development assistance cannot be directly used for 
migration, it is used as leverage for migration management. 
Finally, in addition to these linkages of root causes and using development 
cooperation as leverage, the documents also include a recognition that 
migration may have a positive contribution to development. For example, the 
Agenda on Migration has a section on “Maximising the development benefits for 
countries of origin”, which includes promoting migration-related targets for the 
Sustainable Development Goals (which at the time had not yet been adopted), 
various funding initiatives e.g. to support South-South labour mobility, and 
facilitating the cheaper, faster and safer transfer or remittances. Similarly, 
Towards a reform of the Common European Asylum System and enhancing 
legal avenues to Europe notes: 
“Smart management of migration requires not only a firm policy in 
addressing irregular flows while ensuring protection to those in need, but 
also a proactive policy of sustainable, transparent and accessible legal 
pathways. In line with the global 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, we recognise thereby the positive contribution of migrants 
to inclusive growth and the multidimensional reality of migration requiring 
a coherent and comprehensive response.” (European Commission 
2016c, 14.) 
Thus there is a recognition of a positive contribution of migration for 
development, particularly linking this to the Sustainable Development Goals, 
and a commitment to maximise the development benefits of migration. 
However, this is mentioned much less frequently than the linkages of 
development being used to stop migration and development issues causing 
migration. 
In conclusion, migration and development are presented as interlinked 
phenomena. The main linkage is in development issues being the root causes 
of migration and thus development cooperation being considered a way to 
tackle the root causes in the long term. The term migration-development nexus 
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is not used in the documents, but the positive contribution of migration for 
development is also mentioned, although this is much less prominent compared 
to the connection of the root causes. Migration and development policy are 
considered coherent, as development cooperation can be used to tackle the 
underlying issues causing migration as well as to tackle irregular migration as 
part of a coherent, holistic approach, and on the other hand there is a 
commitment to maximise the development impacts of migration. 
 
4.2. Findings on Policy Coherence for Development in the EU’s external 
(foreign, development and migration) policy strategies 2015-2019 
This section will present the findings concerning the second research question - 
how the concept of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) is used in the 
EU’s external (foreign, development and migration) policy strategies 2015-2019. 
The documents show that PCD is not used much at all anymore in the 
strategies; it is clearly not as prominent as before. This indicates that PCD, 
although still a treaty obligation, is not a political priority in EU external policy. 
This can be clearly seen in the external policy documents. There was not a 
single mention of the term policy coherence for development (or PCD, or PCSD, 
policy coherence for sustainable development) in the entire Agenda on 
Migration or any of the following communications on migration policy. PCD 
requires development objectives to be taken into account in all EU policies with 
potential impacts for developing countries. PCD being left out of migration policy 
documents is not because migration policy is not considered to be linked to 
development, as linkages between development and migration are made 
extensively in the documents (as found above in response to the first research 
question). However, the discussion is much more about how development 
policy can support migration policy rather than the other way round or the 
development impacts of migration policy. Thus PCD is simply not a priority for 
migration policy. 
In the overarching Global Strategy, which is the policy strategy for foreign and 
security policy, PCD is only mentioned once, towards the end (page 50 out of 
56), in a very general and vague phrase: 
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“A more prosperous Union requires economic priorities to be set in 
relations with all countries and regions, and integrated into the external 
dimensions of all internal policies. A more prosperous Union calls for 
greater coordination between the EU and Member States, the EIB and 
the private sector. The Sustainable Development Goals also represent 
an opportunity to catalyse such coherence. Implementing them will 
generate coherence between the internal and external dimensions of our 
policies and across financial instruments. It allows us to develop new 
ways to blend grants, loans and private-public partnerships. The SDGs 
also encourage us to expand and apply the principle of policy coherence 
for development to other policy areas, and encourage joint analysis and 
engagement across Commission services, institutions and Member 
States." (EEAS 2016, 50.) 
This reference to PCD is made in a context of economic prosperity and 
economic priorities to be integrated into the external dimensions of all internal 
policies, and blending of finance. Thus, PCD is primarily linked to trade and 
finance rather than other policy areas such as migration. PCD is also firmly 
linked to the Sustainable Development Goals. Although the term is used in a 
positive vein, as something that is encouraged, the vague phrasing does not 
express a firm commitment to PCD and shows that PCD is not a priority. The 
implementation plan and annual reports of the strategy do not contain any 
mention of the concept, which further underlines that the concept is not 
considered a priority in EU external policy. 
In the New European Consensus on Development, policy coherence for 
development is also mentioned only towards the end (pages 52-3, paragraphs 
109-112). The EU reiterates its commitment to the principle: 
“The EU and its Member States reaffirm their commitment to Policy 
Coherence for Development (PCD), which requires taking into account 
the objectives of development cooperation in policies which are likely to 
affect developing countries. This is a crucial element of the strategy to 
achieve the SDGs and an important contribution to the broader objective 
of Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD). The 2030 
Agenda provides new impetus for the EU and its Member States to 
formulate and implement mutually reinforcing policies.” (European 
Commission 2017, 52.) 
Thus, the commitment to PCD is reaffirmed and reiterated to require taking into 
account development objectives in other policies. Similarly to the Global 
Strategy, PCD is here again firmly linked to sustainable development and the 
2030 Agenda; sustainable development is used to justify PCD and the need for 
45 
 
coherent policy. Indeed, the entire section is titled “Policy coherence for 
development to achieve the SDGs.” 
PCD is to be applied across all policies and areas covered by the 2030 Agenda, 
but six areas are singled out here: 
“The Consensus will guide efforts in applying PCD across all policies and 
all areas covered by the 2030 Agenda, seeking synergies, notably on 
trade, finance, environment and climate change, food security, migration 
and security. Particular attention will be given to combating illicit financial 
flows and tax avoidance, and to promoting trade and responsible 
investment.” (European Commission 2017, 53.) 
This is similar to the five focus areas determined for PCD in 2009: trade and 
finance, food security, climate change, migration, and security. However, 
particular attention is given to finance and trade, suggesting they are the most 
notable focus areas. Furthermore, the Consensus is said to guide the efforts in 
applying PCD. It should be noted that, as analysed above, the Consensus’ 
section on migration mentions using development cooperation as leverage in a 
coordinated approach to migration and to tackle the root causes of irregular 
migration. Thus, in the case of migration, this application of PCD does not 
indicate the kind of prioritisation of development that achieving PCD would 
require. 
The last two paragraphs of the section give some more indication of how PCD 
is used to achieve the SDGs in practice: 
“Sustainable development requires a holistic and cross-sector policy 
approach and is ultimately an issue of governance which needs to be 
pursued in partnership with all stakeholders and on all levels. The EU 
and its Member States will therefore promote whole-of-government 
approaches and ensure political oversight and coordination efforts at all 
levels for SDG implementation. In order to better support policy 
formulation and decision-making, they will ensure the evidence base of 
policy impacts on developing countries through consultations, 
stakeholder engagement, ex-ante impact assessments and ex-post 
evaluations of major policy initiatives.” -- “The EU and its Member States 
will moreover strengthen their dialogue with partner countries on policy 
coherence and support partner countries in their own efforts to put in 
place enabling frameworks for policy coherence for sustainable 
development. They will take the lead in promoting policy coherence at 
international fora such as the UN and the G20, as part of their overall 
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support of the 2030 Agenda in their external action.” (European 
Commission 2017, 53.) 
This seems a rather technical approach to PCD. Coordination, consultations, 
impact assessments and the other mechanisms listed here are all useful tools 
that can support the achievement of PCD and the SDGs. However, in order for 
them to work, a political will and commitment to prioritise sustainable 
development is required. Without that, the promotion of PCD in the EU risks 
continuing on the path of “high on mechanisms, low on achievements” (Carbone 
2016). The final remarks on promoting policy coherence at the multilateral level 
and with partner countries rather highlight the EU’s support for PCD as long as 
it does not require trade-offs in the EU’s own policy agenda, similar to Häbel’s 
(2018) findings on Vietnam. 
Overall, PCD is regarded as important enough to reaffirm as a principle of EU 
external policy. However, it is mentioned in rather vague and general terms and 
only at the end of the Consensus, not referred to throughout the document, and 
thus it lacks significance in practice. 
PCD is very firmly linked to sustainable development and Agenda 2030. It is 
also notable that in the same section, the Consensus also mentions the newer, 
related concept of policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD). PCD 
is considered an important contribution to the broader objective of PCSD. 
However, PCSD is likewise not mentioned elsewhere in the document, and the 
reference here is similarly vague and general without much practical 
significance. This suggests that PCSD is not a priority for the EU either. 
My interviews with EU officials further illustrate how PCD is not a priority in EU 
external policy on the migration-development nexus. For example, the EEAS is 
clearly not working closely on PCD. When asked how familiar they are with the 
concept and whether it was something they encountered much in their work, an 
interviewee from EEAS said: "Familiar in broad strokes, but it’s not something 
that is encountered on a daily basis. Not constantly repeated to be frank." 
Similarly asked about their understanding of PCD, another interviewee at EEAS 
only talked about coherence between different development actors (EU, 
member states, the World Bank and the UN) without any mention about other 
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policies taking into account development objectives. Thus, although displaying 
some knowledge of the concept, this showed an understanding of the concept 
that seemed to be limited to (or at the very least prioritising) what the literature 
would call vertical and multilateral coherence, not including the kind of 
horizontal coherence between development and non-development policies that 
would be relevant for EU external policy if it truly were a priority. 
For DG DEVCO, PCD is still an important part of their work. Both interviewees 
from DEVCO agreed on this. One of them says: 
“Policy coherence for development is a treaty obligation, not something 
we have a choice to do; we need to ensure that all EU policies are not 
hampering our efforts in developing countries. It’s not something we can 
choose to do, it’s something we need to do.” 
However, it has changed since 2015 and they have less influence on the topic 
now. The same interviewee continues on the topic of migration and PCD 
reporting: 
“Migration is one of the five priority policy areas for PCD. -- We have to 
do biannual policy reporting, how PCD has been implemented in our 
policy area. The situation is a lot different now than before 2015. It’s an 
important part of our work. It’s part of an internal system - we have to 
approve them. Before 2015, this is certainly how it worked, whenever a 
new migration policy was launched it would come to our DG and we 
would review it and note if there were some negative consequences. 
Before 2015, this was an honest exercise, and quite a lot of work for us 
to go through to make sure there were no negative consequences, but 
after 2015 it has changed a lot, it rather became policy coherence for 
migration than for development. We are not necessarily consulted, or if 
we are, only very lightly. It’s very clear that the priority is migration and 
not development. We are still doing our work but we are perhaps not 
heard as much. Even if it’s not the case in the treaties, politically 
migration is more important and development concerns are not so much 
listened to.” 
Since 2015, DEVCO is not consulted in the same way anymore; the standard 
inter-service consultation procedure through which new policies would normally 
go through has been cancelled for many migration policies due to them being 
so urgent; in practice this means cancelling the scrutiny from other DGs that 
policies usually go through. 
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In most interviews8, I also pointed out that PCD is no longer prominent in the 
policy documents like it used to be, giving the example that there is no mention 
of the concept in the Agenda on Migration although it was mentioned in the 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in 2011. When I asked what 
the interviewees thought of this, many interviewees (H2, H4, H5) noted that it is 
very telling. An interviewee from DG DEVCO said: 
“It goes with everything. I was there during the GAMM days and those 
were the good days, it [PCD] was a serious exercise back then. Migration 
then became a priority and it changed.” 
Another interviewee noted that it has a lot of significance, how things are written 
in political documents. They said: “If it’s not written down somewhere, it doesn’t 
exist. Text does not come from the sky, it’s people who write it.” These quotes 
further illustrate that if PCD is no longer in the documents, it is no longer a 
priority. 
However, there were also other views. One interviewee from EEAS noted they 
were not involved in drafting those documents and therefore could not say why 
the term is not so prominent anymore, but noted that there are several possible 
explanations. They said that perhaps when more has been achieved and is 
taken for granted, there is not so much need to repeat the term, and suggested 
it could just be that “buzzwords come and go.” 
The interviewee from DG HOME also did not consider it telling of any dramatic 
change, but rather that it reflects on EEAS and DG HOME looking at foreign 
policy from a different perspective than development policy. Thus for them it 
might not be so obvious that the term should be included and therefore it 
sometimes is and sometimes isn’t. Somewhat similarly, H4 commented that 
“sometimes discussions do not meet” - as in, when there are silos, one sector 
may not be so familiar with the jargon of another sector, which might explain 
why migration officials might not use terms like PCD. I would conclude that even 
if that is the case, it is still telling of PCD lacking priority and DEVCO having 
                                               
8 This question was not asked in interview 2 as it was not included in my pre-defined set of 
interview questions. In interview 1 it was an additional follow-up question which I later decided 
useful to ask each interviewee, but only after missing it in the second interview. 
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limited influence on this, as otherwise PCD would be more familiar and 
significant for other DGs as well and be included in the documents. 
 
4.3. Findings on the meaning of coherence in EU external policy 
This section presents the findings on the final research question - what does 
coherence mean in EU external (foreign, migration and development) policy. 
Based on the analysis of policy documents as well as expert interviews, I find 
what is actually meant by coherence and what it is for. 
Although the concept of policy coherence for development (PCD) is not so 
prominent anymore, and its newer iteration PCSD is likewise largely absent 
from the policy documents, coherence in itself is something that the EU does 
seem to emphasise in its external policy. “Coherent” was a positive attribute 
used widely across the documents, signalling effectiveness, unity, and 
credibility as a global player. 
Having analysed all the paragraphs where coherence (or coherent) is 
mentioned, the term is typically associated with being coordinated, joined-up, 
comprehensive, effective or united in a context where there are a number of 
different but interlinked policy sectors and actors at different levels. Coherence 
means coordinating different policies, instruments and actors to pursue a 
common objective, ensuring effectiveness and credibility. Coherence is clearly 
seen as positive; it is only mentioned as something worth striving for. 
For example, in the Agenda on Migration (2015, 6), a need for coherence is 
noted: 
“As outlined by President Juncker in his Political Guidelines, a robust 
fight against irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers, and securing 
Europe's external borders must be paired with a strong common asylum 
policy as well as a new European policy on legal migration. Clearly, this 
requires an enhanced coherence between different policy sectors, such 
as development cooperation, trade, employment, foreign and home 
affairs policies.” 
Here, coherence seems to refer to the coordination between the EU’s policy 
sectors, including development, in pursuit of common aims, i.e. the fight against 
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irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers and securing Europe’s external 
borders, and coherence is hoped to be increased. 
Similarly, a later communication on migration policy states: 
“The ultimate aim of the Partnership Framework is a coherent and 
tailored engagement where the Union and its Member States act in a 
coordinated manner putting together instruments, tools and leverage to 
reach comprehensive partnerships (compacts) with third countries to 
better manage migration in full respect of our humanitarian and human 
rights obligations.” (European Commission 2016b, 6.) 
Here, coherent again seems to be attached to using different channels for the 
pursuit of a common aim, which is the better management of migration whilst 
respectful of humanitarian and human rights obligations. The same 
communication goes on: 
“Increasing coherence between migration and development policy is 
important to ensure that development assistance helps partner countries 
manage migration more effectively, and also incentivises them to 
effectively cooperate on readmission of irregular migrants. Positive and 
negative incentives should be integrated in the EU's development policy, 
rewarding those countries that fulfil their international obligation to 
readmit their own nationals, and those that cooperate in managing the 
flows of irregular migrants from third countries, as well as those taking 
action to adequately host persons fleeing conflict and persecution. 
Equally, there must be consequences for those who do not cooperate on 
readmission and return.” (European Commission 2016b, 9, bold in 
original.) 
In practice, thus, coherence here means using development assistance as 
leverage for migration policy. It is regarded as important to ensure 
effectiveness. 
The Global Strategy highlights unity and acting together in a “joined-up” way in 
external action, and coherence is mentioned several times in relation to this. For 
example, the Global Strategy (2016, 17) notes on “Unity as a guiding principle 
of external action”: 
“Our shared interests can only be served by standing and acting 
together. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to 
deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a 
positive difference in the world. The interests of our citizens are best 
served through unity of purpose between Member States and across 
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institutions, and unity in action by implementing together coherent 
policies.” 
Thus, coherence here seems to refer to consistency and complementarity in 
policies between member states and different EU institutions, and it is needed 
to boost unity and effectiveness. Furthermore, the Global Strategy (2016, 49–
50) states on a joined-up union: 
“Finally, our external action will become more joined-up. Over the years, 
important steps have been taken to this effect: these include institutional 
innovations, such as the Lisbon Treaty’s creation of the double-hatted 
High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission 
(HRVP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). A strong 
EEAS working together with other EU institutions lies at the heart of a 
coherent EU role in the world. Efforts at coherence also include policy 
innovations such as the “comprehensive approach to conflicts and 
crises” and joint programming in development, which must be further 
enhanced.” 
Again, coherence in external action is seen as something to be promoted. 
Coherence makes the EU’s global actorness stronger and more united. 
The interviews also shed light on what exactly policy coherence is for and why 
the EU would seek to pursue coherence. Based on the interviews, policy 
coherence is particularly associated with credibility, efficiency and maximising 
impact (avoiding duplication and making sure one policy does not undermine 
impacts of another), and legitimacy. 
Credibility is highlighted as a key benefit of policy coherence by two 
interviewees. Interviewee 1 says that the EU is seen as more credible to third 
countries, which helps deliver better partnerships: “The more coherent you are, 
the more credible and the better partnerships you can forge with third 
countries”. Interviewee 2 also mentions credibility, as well as legitimacy, saying 
policy coherence is an essential part of open partnership and brings legitimacy 
to the EU’s role in the multilateral system and as a global player. H2 also notes 
policy coherence is even more topical now in the context of Agenda 2030 and 
promoting sustainable development. 
Another benefit seems to be efficiency and maximising impact. Interviewee 2 
says that from a rational economic point of view, if the EU gives a big sum of 
money for development cooperation, it makes sense to review their own actions 
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to ensure “one hand is not taking away what the other one is giving”. Similarly, 
H6 says: “In the context of Agenda 2030, it [policy coherence] is in the interests 
of our partner countries but also in the interests of the EU. We need to make 
sure we are spending money on the right things and not something that is not 
compatible. It’s making sure that we are doing things correctly.” Related to this 
is also avoiding overlap and duplication, which both EEAS interviewees mention 
as key benefits of policy coherence.9 
If coherence means effectiveness, unity and coordination in pursuit of a 
common aim, which objectives and whose interests are the ones pursued? H1 
says: “EU objectives and interests. Sometimes of course even our own interests 
do not align, and then it’s a matter of priorities. And of course it’s not only EU 
interests, also the interests of the third country need to be taken into account; 
where do our interests align and where do they not align.” Similarly, H5 says it’s 
the “overall relations”. H2 takes a more realist view, though it does not 
contradict the others: “Human rights and development policy objectives are not 
the first priority. At the level of principle they may be but then on a practical 
level, it’s the political interests, for example the security interests and so on, 
which are the biggest factor.” This idea of overall EU interests, where security 
interests may typically be prioritised in practice, also fits with the comprehensive 
approach conveyed by the analysed policy strategies. 
What also emerges from the interviews is that policy strategies and 
communications are written on a general level, but the practical implementation 
of policy is always context-specific. Different countries have different situations 
affecting the EU’s interests and priorities there and the practical policy 
implementation. One illustration of this is H3’s description of to what extent 
different policy objectives are complementary or contradictory: 
“It depends, for example when it comes to migration, it depends on the 
country, so for example Morocco is also a destination country, and a 
                                               
9 Avoiding duplication and maximising impact is also mentioned in the policy documents, e.g. 
the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015 - 2020) (05/15) states: “Increasing 
coherence and impact of EU action in third countries Acting together, combining funds, 
expertise and respective strengths will help amplify the impact of EU action against migrant 
smuggling abroad. Improving the coherence between the external actions of the EU, Member 
States and relevant stakeholders is a precondition for maximizing impacts and avoiding 
duplication.” (European Commission 2015b, 9.) 
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transit country. So how we approach it is very different from, say, 
Myanmar. There are also different cultural aspects, for example the 
Maghreb countries are more proximate with the EU compared to Asian 
countries. There’s no contradiction for me, it’s very complementary, but it 
also depends on how the country is approaching this. -- How we work is 
always based on values. When we have policy dialogue with a country, 
we always try to push for these values to be respected. -- In a country, 
everything has to be coordinated. It’s not one or the other, but together. 
Economic, peace, other elements... you have to have these elements 
together.” 
Similarly, H5 notes: 
“The EU is a political organisation rather than just a donor. For example 
in the case of Bangladesh or Pakistan, there is irregular migration [into 
the EU] and problems with returns, but with Pakistan there are also 
security concerns. Many member states would like to put conditions, 
seeing only their own part, but the security cooperation would be 
hampered. So it depends on the countries, but overall with all countries 
it’s a holistic approach. So I wouldn’t say there is a hierarchy [regarding 
objectives].” 
Thus it seems coherence must be taken as emblematic of a holistic approach: 
striving for coherence for EU interests overall and adapted to each country 
context specifically. 
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5. Discussion 
5.1. Interconnections between migration and development and the 
security-migration-development nexus 
In the EU external agendas analysed, migration and development are 
presented as highly interlinked phenomena. The main linkage is in development 
issues being considered the root causes of migration, although the positive 
impact of migration for development is also recognised. Development 
cooperation is presented as a way to tackle the root causes of migration and as 
an instrument that can be used as leverage for migration management. 
The prominence of phrases about development policy tackling the root causes 
of migration is curious considering the literature suggests development may 
actually increase migration (Sørensen 2016). There could be a number of 
possible explanations. Firstly, it may be that politicians and policymakers are 
unaware of the empirical evidence and academic literature and follow a 
politically attractive idea. Secondly, development assistance to tackle root 
causes may actually refer to various aid programmes for displaced people, thus 
referring to more immediate causes of transnational migration rather than the 
underlying root causes. Thirdly, the phrase may refer to development 
cooperation tackling underlying causes of migration, such as poverty, as part of 
a comprehensive and long-term approach, rather than being the only measure 
or in the short term. 
Based on the interviews, it became clear the policymakers are generally aware 
that development can actually increase migration, although they noted some 
high-level officials or politicians may not want to hear it as the root causes 
phrase is politically attractive. It seems that the two other explanations are more 
relevant in this case: using development assistance to tackle root causes of 
migration can refer to tackling both immediate causes (i.e. aid for refugee 
protection and so on) as well as long-term causes as part of a comprehensive 
approach. In any case, the phrase entails the idea of development cooperation 
being used for migration management, and whether or not addressing the root 
causes is effective, the aim is clear, as it is presented as part of a plan to 
reduce the incentives for irregular migration. 
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Although development funding cannot be used for migration management 
measures directly – for example, it cannot be used to pay for flights to return 
irregular migrants – it is used to support migration policy indirectly. 
Development cooperation is used as leverage and to incentivise third countries 
to cooperate on migration issues. Here, the analysis gives further support to the 
concerns expressed by Langan (2018) and Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and 
Zoomers (2010) that development cooperation is not used effectively for 
development. Development cooperation is directed to areas and issues based 
on migration concerns rather than what makes most sense from the poverty 
eradication perspective. 
Furthermore, some of those development issues, such as reintegration, would 
not necessarily exist were it not for the migration policy, and there might be 
other development concerns which would otherwise be prioritised were it not for 
this focus on migration management. Despite not acknowledging any 
responsibility for it, the EU is actually contributing to the need for that 
development aid going into reintegration of returned migrants and refugee 
protection in the first place. This boils down to the EU seeking to limit 
immigration and send migrants back. Prioritising migration management, which 
is a nice way to say restriction of migration, or trying to keep away unwanted 
people, is a political choice rather than some objective feat. This is not to say 
that this choice is somehow wrong, but merely to point out that it is a political 
choice made out of a range of options. 
Migration is a highly sovereignty-sensitive policy area, because it always 
touches upon the concepts of national identity and citizenship, and immigration 
regulation is held to be a “prime expression of the sovereignty of states” (Roos 
2013, 2). Because of this, immigration policy is a particularly sensitive issue at 
the EU level and very tricky to resolve (Roos 2013). Although countries wish to 
retain their sovereignty on immigration, 2015 posed such a crisis that it was 
clear coordination of efforts was necessary — particularly as the Schengen 
agreement enables the free movement of people within the area. Roos (2013, 
33) notes that “EU policies on asylum migration actually extended the states’ 
power over their combined territories by widening control over people’s entry, 
residence, and deportation.” However, the right to seek asylum is a human right 
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established in international law including Article 14 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948), and all EU member states are bound by it. 
Furthermore, the non-refoulement principle prohibits states from returning 
migrants to a country where they may be subjected to persecution, torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or other human rights violations (European 
Commission 2020a). 
The literature reviewed has indicated that migration became increasingly 
securitised in Europe in the run-up to and during the crisis (see e.g. Fakhoury 
2016). Both through discourse and action, migration was framed mainly from a 
security perspective, which also affected the solutions prescribed to deal with 
the issue. EU policy seeking to reduce migration for example through border 
controls and targeting human smuggling networks can also be understood in 
this light. 
Although migration is a broad and complex phenomenon, the policy documents 
do not always distinguish clearly between different types of migrants. The 
Agenda on Migration actually points out at the very beginning that there are 
many different reasons for migration and different types of migrants with 
different impacts and each requiring different responses. A duty to protect 
refugees and a need for legal migration to support with the EU’s long-term 
demographic challenges are noted. Still, most of the policy documents focus on 
managing ‘irregular migration’, implying that the vast majority of those entering 
Europe during the crisis were irregular migrants.10 Actually, most of the migrants 
                                               
10 Irregular migrant, or irregular migration, are not clearly defined in the Agenda, but the 
Commission’s glossary website provides definitions for both. Irregular migrant is defined in the 
EU context as “a third-country national present on the territory of a Schengen State who does 
not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the conditions of entry as set out in the Regulation (EU) 2016/399 
(Schengen Borders Code) or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that EU Member 
State (European Commission 2020b).” Irregular migration is defined as “[m]ovement of persons 
to a new place of residence or transit that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the 
sending, transit and receiving countries (European Commission 2020c). 
Furthermore, the glossary notes that defining the terms has been the subject of considerable 
debate, and the EU has also used different terms. “The term 'irregular' is preferable to 'illegal' 
migrant because the latter carries a criminal connotation, entering a country in an irregular 
manner, or staying with an irregular status, is not a criminal offence but an infraction of 
administrative regulations. Apart from this, juridically and ethically, an act can be legal or illegal 
but a person cannot. Thus more and more the term 'migrant in an irregular situation' or 'migrant 
with irregular status' is preferred (European Commission 2020b).” Furthermore, the glossary 
notes the distinction made by the Council of Europe between illegal migration and irregular 
migrant: “‘illegal’ is preferred when referring to a status or process, whereas ‘irregular’ is 
preferred when referring to a person (European Commission 2020c).” 
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entering the EU by land and sea in 2015 sought asylum (BBC 2016), and 
asylum seekers are not irregular migrants, although they may become irregular 
if their asylum application is rejected. Focusing on irregular migration in this 
context seems to undermine asylum seekers’ credibility and discredit the 
insecurity and persecution most of them were fleeing, further underlining the 
securitisation of migration. 
Furthermore, using the terms ‘irregular migrant’ and ‘irregular migration’ still 
groups together a large and heterogeneous group of people without taking into 
account their diversity or that of their circumstances. This may also relate to the 
securitisation of migration. A generalised mass of people, or irregular migration 
as a faceless process, is easy to portray as a security threat or an ‘invasion’ as 
populists in Europe have done. Thus migrants are seen as a security threat to 
be disposed of, not as individual human beings that are more likely to be victims 
of, rather than a cause of, insecurity. As Sørensen (2012, 63) aptly notes: “The 
vulnerability, uncertainty and insecurity that individual journeying migrants face 
in their quest to cross ever more securitized borders and seas seldom enter the 
equation. Rising death tolls and disappearances of migrants en route make it 
clear that policy discussions related to the migration–security nexus need to 
take broader security issues on board.” Migration is considered primarily, and 
sometimes only, from the perspective of national security of the West. 
Thus, overall, the way EU policy documents portray the interconnections 
between migration and development represents a triple nexus of security-
migration-development. The securitisation of migration implies considering 
migration as a security issue, while the securitisation of development leads to its 
instrumentalisation for security, i.e. migration management. This is similar to 
Delkáder-Palacios’ (2019) findings on the Partnership Framework and migration 
conditionalities on aid. 
There is also a recognition that migration can have positive development 
impacts and a commitment to maximise these benefits in migration and 
development policy, indicative of the migration-development nexus paradigm 
(Sørensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2002). However, this is much 
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less prominent compared to the other linkages of migration and development. 
 
5.2. PCD, normative incoherence and organised hypocrisy 
Regarding the concept of policy coherence for development, the analysis shows 
that PCD is not used much at all anymore in EU external policy agendas, apart 
from some fairly empty-meaning rhetoric commitments coupled with 
descriptions of using development cooperation for migration management. This 
indicates that PCD, although still a treaty obligation, is not a political priority in 
EU external policy. Its newer iteration PCSD is likewise largely absent from the 
policy documents, apart from the New Consensus on Development, indicating it 
is considered mainly relevant for development policy rather than overall external 
policy. The prominence and positive meanings attached to coherence, as well 
as the strong linkages made between development and migration, go on to 
show that the issue with PCD, or the reason for its diminished popularity and 
prominence, is not due to the “policy coherence” but the “for development”. 
This is indicative of the lack of political will to prioritise development over other 
concerns in external policy, and it is unsurprising given previous research and 
theoretical exploration (e.g. Furness and Gänzle 2017; Carbone 2017). 
Development policy having to adapt to other policies rather than the other way 
round is nothing new, as noted in many cases before (e.g. Kanner 2011; 
Korhonen 2012). This can be considered normative incoherence, as coined by 
Koff (2017a), as the EU’s normative principles enshrined in treaties are 
detached from the policy practice. 
Interviews further shed light on this, showing that despite treaty obligations and 
the legal framework not having changed and PCD still being there officially, 
there is enormous pressure from member states and a political priority to 
manage migration and use development for migration management. This also 
fits well with Lavenex’s (2018) discussion of organized hypocrisy. In the case of 
the policy nexus of migration and development, the moral and technical 
expectations are clearly conflicting. On the one hand, there are the expectations 
coming from member states posing the technical constraints of what can be 
done and on the other the normative commitments in treaties. The concept of 
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organised hypocrisy helps to explain the EU’s words and action here: the EU 
has decoupled the words catering to the moral expectations from the action 
reacting to technical expectations, which enables the EU to uphold its normative 
commitments and identity of normative power with liberal values at the 
rhetorical level while at the same time acting in accordance with the constraints 
posed by member states. This tactic results in a sense of hypocrisy due to the 
gap between the EU’s normative words and restrictive action. However, the gap 
between them is not quite as big as was perhaps anticipated, as PCD is simply 
not used much at all anymore in the documents. This reduces the gap between 
words and action (and the ensuing sense of hypocrisy) to some extent, but the 
EU’s normative base is still undermined, as the EU is still officially committed to 
PCD while not taking it into account in migration policy. 
As noted in the literature review, several different types of policy coherence can 
be identified. The formulation of PCD in EU treaties, i.e. all policies with 
potential impacts on developing countries should take into account development 
policy objectives, is most clearly referring to what Carbone (2008) calls 
horizontal policy coherence: coherence between development and non-
development policies. While this type of PCD does not seem to be a priority for 
the EU, as migration policy does not take into account development policy 
objectives, other types of coherence may be easier to achieve. Indeed, vertical 
and multilateral coherence do seem to be something the EU is pursuing, based 
on interviews and policy documents. 
This is perhaps because vertical or multilateral or donor-partner-coherence are 
politically easier, as they are more concerned with efficiency and consistency, 
whereas horizontal coherence really requires making development a priority 
over other policies such as migration, which is politically much more 
challenging. When it comes to multilateral or donor-partner-coherence, the EU 
can more easily follow its normative principles as there is less conflicting 
pressure from the member states’ non-development sectors. Applying Brunsson 
(1989) and Lavenex (2018) here, the expectations produced by the technical 
environment here are not so strong or conflicting with the normative 
expectations as they are in the case of horizontal coherence. This results in less 
of a gap between the normative discourse and the action dictated by the 
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technical environment, and thus no hypocrisy. 
 
5.3. Coherence as a holistic approach for EU interests 
Although PCD is no longer prominent, coherence in itself is something that the 
EU does seem to emphasise in its external policy. “Coherent” and “coherence” 
are mentioned widely across the documents and without exception used as a 
positive attribute or something to be enhanced. While the concept of PCD has 
been explored in the literature quite extensively, coherence in itself has been 
not been theorised as such. 
Based on the analysis, coherence in the case of EU external policy means 
coordinating different policies, instruments and actors to pursue a common 
objective, ensuring effectiveness, unity and credibility. It can be understood to 
refer to a holistic approach to pursue the EU’s overall interests, although the 
objectives are adapted to each country context specifically. However, it seems 
development is not a priority; rather, development cooperation is used for other 
external policy objectives such as migration management. 
An interesting parallel may be found in Canadian development policy. Stephen 
Brown (2016) analyses the securitisation of Canadian foreign aid, specifically 
how the way the donor government’s framing and allocation of foreign aid 
changed in the mid-2000s. An increased focus on security-related issues 
privileged certain aid recipients and modified the relationships between the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and other Canadian 
government bodies. One key concept which played a role in this was the 
“whole-of-government approach”, which was used as “a rationale and a 
mechanism for using ODA funds in support of Canadian foreign policy 
objectives that were not primarily motivated by development concerns.” (Brown 
2016, 113.) Thus applying the concept helped the Canadian government 
instrumentalise CIDA and use development funds for non-development-related 
purposes, notably security, and justified the use of security actors to deliver aid, 
in ways that contradict the Western donor consensus on aid effectiveness. 
Brown (2016, 114) notes that ”this securitization process sought to make aid 
more effective in realizing Canadian foreign policy objectives, though in 
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Afghanistan it had limited success in that regard and actually decreased the 
effectiveness of Canadian ODA from a developmental point of view.” After 
2011, Canadian foreign aid appeared to be decreasingly aligned with the 
country’s security interests and increasingly with its commercial ones. (Brown 
2016.) 
The Canadian experience provides an interesting reference point for the EU, as 
the whole-of-government approach is similar to the integrated or comprehensive 
approach presented in the Global Strategy. It includes the idea of integrating 
development cooperation, which has traditionally been more separate, into 
foreign and security policy and using it as part of a range of foreign policy 
instruments for overall external policy objectives. It is also notable although by 
no means surprising that the development effectiveness of aid used in this way 
was lower. Brown notes that since 2011, securitisation seemed to wane but 
rather than give space for development objectives, there were signs of 
instrumentalisation for trade and finance objectives. Similarly in the case of the 
EU, it’s not that security or migration is always the priority; rather the priority is 
context-specific, and in the bigger picture it is the overall relations – what could 
be called “coherence for the EU”. However, it seems that poverty reduction, 
which remains the stated primary aim of EU development cooperation, is not a 
priority for overall EU interests. From the point of view of development policy, 
the holistic approach mainly seems to legitimise the instrumentalisation of 
development assistance for other external policy objectives. 
Prioritising the EU’s own interests can be understood as realist, further 
undermining the idea of a normative power Europe. Of course, realpolitik may 
also include promoting liberal values, as that can sometimes also be in the 
realist interests of the EU (Youngs 2016). In any case, the EU’s approach to its 
relationships with third countries is based on the EU’s interests rather than the 
needs and interests of the partner country. This is a far cry from the idea of 
normative PCD contributing to transformative development, and rather similar to 
Thede’s (2013) findings on PCD being used to pursue policy coherence for the 
donor’s security, trade and other interests, typically in the form of “whole-of-
government” or “integrated” approaches. Although PCD is no longer prominent, 
it seems this holistic, integrated or comprehensive approach is now used to 
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justify diverting development cooperation from its own aims to the pursuit of 
other policy objectives. 
In conclusion, ‘coherence’ denotes the EU’s holistic, comprehensive, integrated 
approach described in the Global Strategy. It coordinates the whole range of 
policies and instruments in pursuit of the EU’s external policy objectives, and 
although the objectives vary and are context-specific, development is not a 
priority. The analysis here further suggests that ‘coherence’ as an emblem of 
the holistic approach is used to legitimise the instrumentalisation of 
development cooperation for the EU’s overall external policy objectives. 
 
5.4. Concluding reflection 
Reflecting on these findings as a whole, the EU’s approach to the policy nexus 
of migration and development is largely securitised, and as a result, poverty 
reduction is not prioritised, but migration management is considered a priority of 
EU external policy. In the same vein, the normative principle of PCD has been 
all but replaced with a rather more realist discourse of coherence, signalling a 
comprehensive, integrated approach that legitimises the instrumentalisation of 
development cooperation for the EU’s overall external interests. 
To conclude this discussion, it is useful to take a step back from the details of 
the Commission’s external policy documents prepared in the midst of the 
migration crisis. The extent to which the EU is even able to achieve policy 
coherence (whether for development or not) is limited by the nature of the EU. It 
is a massive multi-level community with pull and push in different directions. 
What started out as a project to end wars between France and Germany and 
became an economic community has turned into a deeply integrated and 
multidimensional political, economic and socio-cultural project. However, the 
path has not been a simple one and there are very different opinions about the 
EU’s role and future. Although the EU has been considered a normative power, 
liberal values such as democracy, human rights and non-discrimination that the 
EU is meant to exude in its external action are increasingly questioned even 
within the Union. 
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The EU is between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, there is the 
normative basis, the values upon which the EU was built and which it is treaty-
bound to promote. On the other hand, it is facing pressure to restrict migration, 
and lack of solidarity between member states as well as disagreement over 
questions of national sovereignty which have always been tough. Migration has 
historically not been an EU competence but a national one, although following 
the Lisbon Treaty the external aspect of migration has also become more 
integral to EU policy. Although the reaction to the migration crisis was one of 
further securitisation and division, crises caused by imperfect integration in the 
Union’s history have sometimes actually furthered integration - as Scipioni 
(2018) notes, the EU has been “failing forward.” However, the EU can only ever 
be what the member states let it be, and at the moment, the winds are not very 
liberal. 
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6. Conclusion 
6.1. Conclusions of the research 
This thesis has studied how the interconnections between migration and 
development and the policies related to them are presented, how the concept of 
policy coherence for development is used, and what coherence means, in EU 
external (foreign, migration and development) policy from the beginning of the 
migration crisis in 2015 to the end of the Juncker administration in 2019. 
The study has found that migration and development are presented as highly 
interlinked phenomena in EU policy documents. The main linkage is in 
development issues being the root causes of migration and thus development 
cooperation being a way to tackle the root causes in the long term. The term 
migration-development nexus is not used in the documents, but the positive 
contribution of migration for development is also mentioned, although this is 
much less prominent compared to the connection of the root causes. 
Coordination and coherence between development and migration policy has 
improved, however it is mainly coherence for migration. Adding to the literature 
on the securitisation of migration and development, the study finds that 
migration management and migration policy objectives such as returning 
irregular migrants to countries of origin are considered a priority for which 
development cooperation can be used as leverage. Although poverty 
eradication remains the primary objective of the EU’s development policy, 
development cooperation is also used for other policy sectors’ objectives, such 
as managing irregular migration. This supports previous research showing that 
the EU’s development cooperation is increasingly being used for migration 
management. 
This is conflicting with the inherently normative principle of policy coherence for 
development which the EU has committed to. However, this is not unexpected 
as the literature indicates the EU has always been reluctant to prioritise 
development over other policy objectives. However, whereas before the 
concept of PCD was only implemented weakly or used to legitimise market 
liberalisation policies, it is now simply not used as much anymore. Wholly 
absent from the Agenda on Migration and only briefly mentioned in the Global 
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Strategy, PCD is mainly addressed in the sector of development cooperation, 
indicating it is not a priority for EU external policy. The conflict between the EU’s 
stated normative principles and the instrumentalisation of aid can be considered 
normative incoherence and organized hypocrisy, which can undermine the EU’s 
credibility as a global actor and supposedly normative power. 
Although the concept of policy coherence for development (PCD) is not so 
prominent anymore, and its newer iteration PCSD is likewise largely absent 
from the policy documents, coherence in itself is something that the EU does 
seem to emphasise in its external policy. “Coherent” and “coherence” are 
mentioned widely across the documents and without exception used as a 
positive attribute or something to be enhanced. In the policy documents, 
coherence means coordinating different policies, instruments and actors to 
pursue a common objective, ensuring effectiveness, unity and credibility. The 
common objective refers to the EU’s overall interests, although these are 
adapted to each country context specifically. This study suggests coherence 
can be understood as emblematic of a holistic approach used to legitimise the 
instrumentalisation of development cooperation for the EU’s overall external 
policy objectives. 
 
6.2. Further research 
This thesis has barely scratched the surface of policy coherence and the 
security-migration-development nexus in EU external policy, leaving open a 
number of exciting questions for further research and theoretical exploration. 
Firstly, this research has focused on horizontal coherence - coherence between 
development and non-development policies of the EU itself. An important 
avenue for further research, especially considering the conflicting pressures on 
the EU coming from the member states, would be to research vertical 
coherence, between the EU and member states, on migration and development 
policies. Furthermore, the EU is not alone in being subject to securitisation 
pressures. For example, one interviewee noted that what is “DACable”, i.e. what 
is accepted as ODA by the OECD-DAC, has changed over the years to include 
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more migration or security related objects. Thus multilateral and donor-partner 
coherence related to the migration-development nexus would also be 
interesting areas for future research, to examine how the securitisation of 
migration has affected other development actors and how partner countries are 
dealing with this. 
Moreover, while this research has been on a general level on PCD and the 
policies on migration and development in the EU, for further research it would 
be useful to focus on a specific case study in more depth. For example, the 
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) 
which is currently being negotiated would provide a very interesting case for 
future research, as an interviewee pointed out that PCD is mentioned in the 
proposal for the instrument, but NDICI may well prove controversial as it 
combines different policy objectives, including migration and development, as 
well as EU neighbourhood policy. 
Finally, from a theoretical standpoint, the EU’s holistic or integrated approach 
could be studied more critically. In particular, the connection between the EU’s 
integrated approach and policy coherence could be further explored. In addition, 
this research suggests a need for further theorising of (policy) coherence. 
Perhaps connecting policy coherence to the Foucauldian concept of 
governmentality could help explore how “coherence” may be used to govern. 
 
6.3. Future implications and final remarks 
This research considered the time frame between the beginning of the migration 
crisis in 2015 and the end of the Juncker administration in late 2019. Now there 
is a new Commission led by Ursula Von Der Leyen, a new HR/VP and a new 
college of commissioners. How the new commission approaches PCD and the 
interconnections between migration and development policy remains to be 
seen. We can speculate based on certain changes, such as the lack of a 
Commissioner for Development - Jutta Urpilainen’s title is Commissioner for 
International Partnerships. Her mission letter does not mention PCD (European 
Commission 2019a). This is notable to consider not least as a new EU-ACP 
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Partnership is currently being negotiated. The lack of PCD in the mission letter 
does not bode for a development-oriented partnership but in this light rather 
more self-interest from the side of the EU. 
Furthermore, Von der Leyen’s college of commissioners was to include a 
portfolio entitled “Protecting our European Way of Life.” The commissioner in 
question, Margaritis Schinas, is in charge of migration policy. His mission letter 
notes: 
“The European way of life is built around solidarity, peace of mind and 
security. We must address and allay legitimate fears and concerns about 
the impact of irregular migration on our economy and society. This will 
require us to work together to find common solutions which are grounded 
in our values and our responsibilities. We must also work more closely 
together on security, notably on new and emerging threats that cut 
across borders and policies.” (European Commission 2019b, 4.) 
This was immediately criticised by NGOs and politicians, for example Amnesty 
International said that "linking migration with security in the portfolio of the 
'Commissioner for Protecting our European Way of Life' risks sending a 
worrying message", while Friends of the Earth tweeted that "the idea that 
'Europeans' need to be shielded from external cultures is fascist thinking that 
shouldn't be near migration policy" (Euronews 2019). Following the criticism, the 
portfolio title was changed to “Promoting our European way of life” (European 
Commission 2019c). Still, considering these, the security-migration-
development nexus and analysis of European external policies will remain 
relevant during the Von der Leyen Commission. The findings of this thesis will 
help put the new commission’s speeches and actions in context. 
Of course, the few months that the commission has now been in place have 
shown a rapidly changing and unforeseeable future. The extraordinary 
pandemic during which this thesis was written poses challenges for the EU 
which may surpass those of the migration crisis. Whether the pandemic makes 
us all see global interdependencies in a new light and whether our reaction is 
one of increased securitisation, protectionism and denialism or of solidarity and 
conviviality is yet to be determined. 
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